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1. INTRODUCTION
Pragmatism is a robust philosophy, vernacular hand-waving, a
method of judicial and administrative decisionmaking, and, more
recently, justification for a certain type of political activism. While
philosophical, judicial, and administrative pragmatism have
garnered substantial attention and analysis from scholars,' we have
been much stingier with pragmatic activism--that which, in the
1. On administrative and judicial pragmatism, see, for example, DANIEL A. FARBER, EGO-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999);
Mary Jane Angelo, Emtbracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvenfion
of a First Generation Environmrental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105 (2006);Justin Desautels-Stein, At
War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemnporawy Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH ST. L. REV.
565 (2007); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393
(1981); Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theoiy, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Jamie A. Grodsky, The Paradox of (Eco)Pragmalism, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1037 (2003); David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Senen Variations on a Theme by Holmes),
48 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1996) (reviewing RICHlARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw (1994));
Keith Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique in Environmental Law, 21
STIAN ENVrL. L.J. 225 (2002);Joel A. Mintz, Some Thonghts on the Merits of Prag-matism, as a Guide
to Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2004); Richard A. Posner, What I-as
Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653 (1990);J.B. Ruhi, Is the Endangered Species Act
EcoJPragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003); Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the
Politics of Power in Environental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005); Amy J. Wildermuth, Eco-
Pragmatism and Ecology: What's Leopold Cot to Do with It?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1145 (2003). On
traditionally philosophical approaches to environmental pragmatism, see, for example,
ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM (Andrew Light & Eric Katz eds., 1996); J. Baird Callicott, The
Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmnental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse, 11
ENVTL. VALUES 3 (2002); Anthony Weston, Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental
Ethics, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 321 (1985).
2. A series of articles from 2011 in the journal Biiological Conservation do begin to broach
the subject of pragmatism in environmental practice, but do not uniformly describe their
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spirit of the twenty-first century's 140-character limit, I will call
"pragtivism." This Article is an introduction to pragtivism-
environmental pragtivism in particular-a critique of the practice,
and a constructive framework for addressing some of my critiques.
To properly introduce pragtivism, I begin with two stories. Or
rather, I begin with one story told two ways:
In 2012, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the State of Texas,
and private landowners finalized a landmark conservation plan that
represents the cooperative, win-win future of environmental protection.3 The
Texas Conservation Plan offers cost-effective, long-term protection to the
imperiled Dunes Sagebrush Lizard while also fostering economic growth and
energy independence.' The Conservation Plan establishes guidelines that
avert many disruptive activities in Lizard habitat and promotes habitat
mitigation when landowners cannot avoid development in Lizard habitat.-
The Plan also establishes a flexible, market-based instrument for efficiently
creating effective conservation incentives.6 The protections offered from this
analysis as one of "pragmatism" in action and tend to take a more issue-specific approach
rather than a critical approach to the application of philosophical and vernacular
pragmatism. Thomas 0. McShane et al., Hard Choices: Making Trade-Offs Between Biodiversity
Conservation and Human Well-Being, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 966 (2011); Thaddeus R.
Miller et al., The New Conservation Debate: The View from Practical Ethics, 144 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 948 (2011); Ben A. Minteer & Thaddeus R. Miller, The New Conservation
Debate: Ethical Foundations, Strategic Trade-Offs, and Policy Opportunities, 144 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 945 (2011); John G. Robinson, Ethical Pluralism, Pragmatism, and Sustainability
in Conservation Practice, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 958 (2011); Nick Salafsky, Integrating
Development with Conservation: A Means to a Conservation End, or a Mean End to Conservation?,
144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 973 (2011). J.B. Ruhl has also begun to describe the role of
activism and advocacy from something that approaches a pragmatic stance but is still quite
distinct. J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385 (2002)
[hereinafter Manifesto]. Doug Kysar and Jim Salzman have also offered a critique of Ruhl's
approach that touches on a role for environmental advocates. Douglas A. Kysar & James
Salzman, Environmental Tibalism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1099 (2003).
3. TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS ET AL., TEXAS CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE
DUNES SAGEBRUSH LIZARD (SCELOPORUS ARENICOLUS) (2012), https://www.fws.gov/
southwest/es/Documents/R2ES/TX CP_forDSL_20120213.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWZ4-
5CPE] [hereinafter TEXAS PLAN].
4. See id. at 1 ("The goal of the Plan is to facilitate continued and uninterrupted
economic activity in the Permian Basin ... and to promote conservation of the [Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard] with the ESA."); id. at 12 ("The Plan will provide a streamlined and
innovative mechanism for the Permit Holder and other public and private entities to comply
with the ESA."); id. at 16 ("The proposed term for the Plan is 30 years.").
5. Defs. of Wildlife v.Jewell, 815 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
6. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 10-12.
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innovative plan will protect the Dune Sagebrush Lizard into the future and
avoid the need to list the Lizard under the Endangered Species Act.7
Alternatively:
In 2012, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service denied the Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard the vigorous protections of the Endangered Species Act
based on a speculative, voluntary, confidential, and unenforceable promise
made by the oil and gas industry." The Service determined that the so-called
Texas Conservation Plan, a plan crafted and implemented by the oil and
gas industry, would offer sufficient protections for the Lizard, and therefore
ameliorate the need to offer the Lizard the explicit and enforceable
safeguards of the Endangered Species Act.9 The Texas Conservation Plan is
merely a set of voluntary guidelines for landowners, who are free to ignore
them.'0 And the plan was approved so shortly before the Fish and Wildlife
Service's decision not to list the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard that any benefit of
the Texas Plan, which was demonstrably drafted only to avoid real
regulation, is purely speculative."
These sorts of dueling, nominally pro-environmental perspectives
on a single environmental action have become common. In
addition to other Endangered Species Act decisions of this sort,
such as a non-listing of the Greater Sage Grouse," or the de-listing
of the Lesser Prairie Chicken as a result of a judicial order that
demanded more deference to private voluntary conservation,"
7. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to
List the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,872, 36,872 (June 19, 2012) ("This
withdrawal is based on our conclusion that the threats to the species as identified in the
proposed rule no longer are as significant as believed at the time of the proposed rule. We




10. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 10.
11. See Withdrawal, sufrra note 7, at 36,878 (noting the Texas Plan's approval date as
February 17, 2012); id. at 36,872 (showing the withdrawal date of June 19, 2012, only four
months after the Plan was approved).
12. Press Release, Office of the Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Historic Conservation
Campaign Protects Greater Sage-Grouse (Sept. 22, 2015) (noting reduced threats because of
state-level conservation planning).
13. Press Release, Office of Commc'n, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service Lists Lesser Prairie-Chicken as Threatened Species and Finalizes Special Rule
Endorsing Landmark State Conservation Plan (Mar. 27, 2014); Press Release, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Removes Lesser Prairie-Chicken from List of
Threatened and Endangered Species in Accordance with Court Order (July 19, 2016); see
abo Permian Basin Petroleum Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 127 F. Supp. 3d 700 (W.D. Tex.
2015) (describing, and finding in favor of, the claims of the oil and gas industry that the Fish
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Congress recently passed, and in June 2016 President Obama
signed, a law reforming the Toxic Substances Control Act." The
President described how the new law would "do away with an
outdated bureaucratic formula" and praised the "industry leaders
here today who've pushed hard for this law."'5 He also praised the
Environmental Defense Fund.'6 The Environmental Defense Fund
was there as a representative of the environmental community
because most other groups were not supporting the law. The
Natural Resources Defense Council, for example, had long
expressed concerns including the lack of clear standards and the
fact that the new law would prohibit states from actively regulating
toxic substances at a higher standard than the federal government
provided.'7
The point of calling attention to this recent legislative action is
not to condemn it or the Environmental Defense Fund for
supporting it. The purpose is to emphasize open questions that are
also embedded in the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard controversy: What
is the value of ostensibly win-win, partnership-oriented
compromises in environmental policy? Can giving heightened
deference to these processes lead to reactionary support for
policies that use these processes but may not have good
environmental outcomes? And how environmentalists can properly
assess what almost amounts to bi-lateral lawmaking.
Returning now to the Lizard, the two perspectives outlined in the
story above are not caricatures and this is not a fiction. In June
2012 the United States Fish and Wildlife Service did indeed
withdraw an earlier proposal to list the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard
under the Endangered Species Act.'8  In its press release
accompanying the withdrawal, the Service described the
and Wildlife Service did not properly account for the private conservation agreements meant
to protect the species and prevent listing under the Endangered Species Act).
14. Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182,
130 Stat. 448 (2016); see also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Bill
Signing of the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (June 22,
2016).
15. Remarks by President Obama, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, KEY CONCERNS WITH THE CHEMICAL SAFETY IMPROVEMENT
ACT (LAUTENBERG/ViTER S.1009) (2013).
18. Withdrawal, supra note 7, at 36,872.
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"landmark" decision in terms similar to those in the story above."
The Environmental Defense Fund, the only environmental group
to endorse the controversial policy, likewise issued a press release
praising the non-listing and describing it as "proof that working
with landowners can pay big dividends for wildlife." 2 0 At the same
time, the Center for Biological Diversity and Defenders of Wildlife,
two environmental groups long invested in the survival of the
Lizard, filed a lawsuit challenging the non-listing.2 ' The lawsuit
highlighted the fact that the Texas Plan was confidential, vague,
speculative, voluntary, and most strikingly, managed by lobbyists
from the Texas Oil and Gas Association.
The Dunes Sagebrush Lizard lawsuit rose on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which
agreed with the Fish and Wildlife Service that under certain
circumstances a voluntary and unproven conservation agreement
can supplant the need to list a species under the Endangered
Species Act.23 What is most interesting about the decision is the
way that it reflected several key tenets-which I will describe in
much more detail below-of a pragtivist approach to
decisionmaking.
The court opened its opinion by describing how the Texas
Conservation Plan would "engage private businesses in conservation
efforts."24 The court closed with a reminder that "[t]he Texas plan
may not be foolproof, but neither is every regulatory regime."2 1
These two phrasings reflect the same pragmatic and pragtivist
approaches that I will explore in more detail below.2 6 Admitting,
for instance, that no regulation is perfect and that a challenge to a
19. Press Release, Office of the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Landmark Conservation
Agreements Keep Dunes Sagebrush Lizard off the Endangered Species List in NM, TX (June
13, 2012).
20. Press Release, Enytl. Def. Fund, EDF Supports Fish & Wildlife Service Approach for
Dunes Sagebrush Lizard (June 13, 2012), https://www.edf.org/news/edf-supports-fish-
wildlife-service-approach-dunes-sagebrush-lizard [https://perma.cc/CCT2-KEB9].
21. Complaint, Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, 70 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 13-
0919).
22. Id. at 2-3.
23. Defs. of Wildlife v.Jewell, 815 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
24. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 17.
26. As described more below, I use the term "pragmatic" or "pragmatism," except
perhaps in the title, to refer only to philosophical pragmatism. I will use the term
"vernacular pragmatism" when referring to something less reasoned and critical as it is
usually understood in common conversation.
430 [Vol. 42:2
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regulatory decision cannot stand simply because of mere
imperfections, the opinion embodies a key principle of
pragmatism: that absolutes, including perfection, are neither
helpful for effective decisionmaking nor are they even useful ideals.
As a central principle of their philosophy, pragmatists reject
absolutes. Pragtivists, likewise, reject perfect environmental
outcomes in deference to those that are, at least arguably,
directionally correct. The idea of engaging private business is a
more applied, but equally important principle. Pragmatists
advocate that decisions are good if they work, if they are based on
lessons from experience. Pragtivists believe that because engaging
private businesses is a departure from their concept of "traditional"
environmentalism, towards a path of less resistance, it is a superior
process for environmental protection.
The Texas Plan, however, was not exactly designed to "engage
private business in conservation efforts,"2 as the court said, nor was
it "proof that working with landowners can pay big dividends,"2 8 as
the Environmental Defense Fund said. In fact, the plan was largely
designed for and managed by private industry, as described more
below.29 The Texas Plan does not represent the Fish and Wildlife
Service and environmentalists managing to coax progress out of
industry. Rather it represents industry coaxing support out of the
government and, much more remarkably, environmental
pragtivists-those environmentalists who operate under the banner
of pragmatism.
Several questions emerge from the creation of the Texas Plan,
the Environmental Defense Fund's support of the Plan, and the
D.C. Circuit's eventual approval. For instance, does the plan work?
Years after its creation there is strong evidence that it does not.
There has been significant new habitat disturbance in the Lizard's
range and internal politics within the oil and gas industry have led
to the unraveling of the non-profit entity that the Texas Oil and
Gas Association created specifically to implement and monitor the
27. Defs. of Wildlife, 815 F.3d at 2 (emphasis added).
28. Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., TEXAS PIAN, supra note 3, at 1 ("The goal of the Plan is to facilitate
continued and uninterrupted economic activity."); Complaint, supra note 21, at 2
("Compounding the problem, Texas has delegated authority to implement the agreement o
a private entity called the 'Texas Habitat Conservation Foundation,' which is actually run by
three lobbyists from the Texas Oil and Gas Association, the very industry that benefits from
activities that destroy the lizard's habitat.").
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Plan.3 0  If industry-led conservation in this vein is the future of
environmentalism, how did we arrive at this point, and how can
pragtivist organizations take care not to support decisions as facially
flawed as this one? Finally, why do activists so love the word
"pragmatic?" Is there a relationship between certain forms of
environmental advocacy and pragmatic philosophy or do some use
the word simply because of the good reputation it seems to have in
society?
This Article is a first attempt to answer some of these questions
and to generate more analysis of the influence of pragmatism on
environmental activism. The next Part presents a novel typology of
pragmatisms, describing the different ways that the philosophy has
been applied both explicitly and implicitly by a number of
important figures. Part III recounts the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard
controversy in more detail to serve as a background on which to
view more abstract issues of philosophy and activism. Part IV then
attempts to unpack pragtivism, sketching a profile of pragtivism
and placing it in contrast to "traditional" environmentalism both
because the contrast is helpful in understanding pragtivism and
because it is a large part of how pragtivists define themselves. In
this same Part, I also offer my own critique of pragtivism, primarily
in terms of its real-world application and effectiveness, explaining
that it provides a weak basis for lasting environmental protection
because it does not adequately consider public input, sufficiently
learn from its own shortcomings, or fairly define itself or its
alternatives, and at base, there is too little evidence of its positive
environmental impacts. Finally, in Part V, I respond to my own
critique and offer a constructive framework for decisionmaking
that can partially rectify pragtivism's weak points. That framework
insists on attention to transparency, accountability, monitoring,
large-scale impacts, precaution, good faith of partners, public
participation, long-term strategy, and the signals that a pragtivist
30. Ya-Wei Li, How a Satellite Helped Protect a Texas Lizard, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE BLOC
(May 12, 2014), http://www.defendersblog.org/2014/05/satellite-helped-protect-texas-lizard
[https://perma.cc/JE7X-LMAB]; Eric Dexheimer & Asher Price, State Fires Organization
Formed by Big Oil to Manage Threatened Lizard, MYSTATESMAN (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/state-fires-organization-formed-big-oil-manage-
threatened-lizard/EZGPYuOUe2bTyok3cSPSjN [https://perma.cc/2UXY-MAYV]; Texas
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position might send. Although I hope the framework will make
pragtivism more satisfying and effective, I am aware that some
pragtivists may complain that I have offered too much of traditional
environmental law. In a sense, I cannot contend with this likely
challenge. But pragmatically, I am compelled to suggest that
environmentalists advocate for more of what works, from
experience, and less of what doesn't.
II. A TYPOLOGY AND TAXONOMY OF THE MANY FACES OF
PRAGMATISM
The purpose of this Article is to define, understand, and seek to
improve the use of pragtivism-that is, pragmatism in activism.
The trouble with this endeavor is that "pragmatism" itself is a vague
and unruly word. Even when used in its strictest sense, as a century-
old American philosophy, the precise definition is sometimes
elusive. (Though perhaps that is simply the nature of philosophy.)
Part IV of this Article will specifically explore the permutations,
expectations, and implementations of pragtivism in detail. This
Part, then, attempts to lay out the primary variants of pragmatism
in law and governance, ultimately narrowing to a few forms of
environmental pragmatism. In parallel with this typology, this Part
will also trace a taxonomy, linking some of the relationships and
influences between each of the pragmatisms described.
A. Vernacular Pragmatism
It is necessary to start with vernacular pragmatism because this is
the pragmatism with which we are most often confronted.
Vernacular pragmatism is a claim to do "whatever works."
Although this form of pragmatism is very common and in some
ways easy to define, it is also the least nuanced and least meaningful
use of the word. It is common but largely unhelpful. It is, as Lisa
Heinzerling has said, "unfancy," "unphilosophical," and "an
anxious-to-please kind of pragmatism, without much room for
strong feelings."3 ' Because it is unphilosophical, uncritical, and
unfancy, because it is simply a signal and not a goal, process, or way
of knowing, vernacular pragmatism "may provide cover for simple
31. Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1426
(2000) (reviewing FARBER, supra note 1).
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power politics, unprincipled compromise, and even cynicism."32
This unflattering definition is not unique. Almost uniformly,
writers, philosophers especially, are obliged to begin discussions of
philosophical pragmatism by distinguishing it from vernacular
pragmatism.
In one of the first insertions of philosophical pragmatism into
environmental ethics, philosopher Anthony Weston began by
writing that "' [p] ragmatism' sounds like just what environmental
ethics is against: shortsighted, human-centered instrumentalism.
In popular usage that connotation is certainly common."3 3 David
Luban uses the term "primitive pragmatism" to identify the
common usage, explaining that this lewd pragmatism "is what
journalists mean when they describe a politician as a pragmatist."
3 4
The politician may respect principles and logic but would never let
either get in the way of action or drive him to extremes. In his
opening essay in the first edited volume to explore pragmatism in
environmental thought, Kelly Parker begins immediately by
clarifying that "' [p]ragmatism' here refers to a school of
philosophical thought-American Pragmatism-and not to that
short sighted, allegedly 'practical-minded' attitude towards the
world that is a major obstacle to environmentally responsible
behavior in our time. "36 Talisse and Aiken assure their readers that
"[t] his is a philosophy book, and the pragmatism with which we are
concerned is not the pragmatism of common parlance.",3
So, what is vernacular pragmatism? A person using the term
might say that it is a willingness to do what works to achieve a goal,
but in practice, vernacular pragmatism is simply a declaration. It
does not rely on underlying process or betray underlying values.
While the vernacular pragmatist might say that she is doing "what
works," she has not considered why her plan might work, nor based
the plan in any special experience. Likewise, while she has a
specific goal in mind, she has not critically examined why that goal
is a reasonable or valid goal in the first place.
32. Id. at 1427.
33. Weston, supra note 1, at 321.
34. Luban, supra note 1, at 1007.
35. Id. at 1007-08.
36. Kelly A. Parker, Pragmatism and Environmental Thought, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PRAGMATISM, supra note 1, at 21, 21.
37. ROBERT B. TALISSE & Scorr F. AIKEN, PRAGMATISM: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED, at 1
(2008).
434 [Vol. 42:2
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Vernacular pragmatism, therefore, is the nominal rejection of
ideology and dogma, except that the specific goal to which it is
aimed may be paradigmatically dogmatic. Take for example the
pro-life activist who kills a doctor because the doctor performs
abortions. The activist may claim to be pragmatic, insofar as he is
willing to do whatever it takes to achieve his goal, expectations and
norms be damned. While the killer claims to reject the dogmatic
constraints of his fellow activists (that is, killing is wrong), his goal
(to end abortion) is no less dogmatic.
This vernacular pragmatism, therefore, amounts to little more
than veiling ideologies either without intent or in order to shield
tactics from criticism. Any who dare to criticize become ideologues
more concerned with their theory than with the real world. The
failure of this line of reasoning is captured in a critique from
Charles Pierce, one of the founders of philosophical pragmatism.
One may resolve not to engage in philosophical speculation given
that such speculation may slow or distract from action.
Nevertheless, by avoiding philosophical speculation one will not
avoid philosophy; one will merely engage with it unwittingly and
adopt "crude and uncriticized" ethics.38 Thus to accept, reject, or
adjust pragmatism in any form, it does no good to simply ignore it;
rather, we must begin by understanding it.
B. Philosophical Pragmatism
Philosophers are quick to point out that philosophical
pragmatism is difficult to define." When lawyers write about the
philosophy they do not hedge quite so much.0 Environmentalists
often avoid definition altogether. Mark Tercek, for example, the
former managing partner at Goldman Sachs who went on to
become the President and CEO of The Nature Conservancy, the
38. Parker, supra note 36, at 24 (quoting 1 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, How to Make Our
Ideas Clear, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 1 129 (Charles
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Harvard University Press 1932)).
39. E.g., Andrew Light & Eric Katz, Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and
Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra note 1, at 1,
1-2; BEN A. MINTEER, THE LANDSCAPE OF REFORM: Civic PRAGMATISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Ti IOUGHT IN AMERICA, at 6 (2006); TALISSE & AiKEN, supra note 37, at 2.
40. E.g., Desautels-Stein, supra note 1, at 574; Mintz, supra note 1, at 1; Posner, supra note
1, at 1654.
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country's largest environmental non-profit," wrote a book on
pragmatic approaches to environmental protection, hinting at
vernacular pragmatism by saying that "[clonservation organizations
should do all they can" to make government, business, and people
work together for conservation. In 198 pages, however, he used a
variation of the word pragmatism just twice and did not define it.1
This use of the word, to signal virtue without more, might persuade
a particularly harsh critic that pragtivism is merely vernacular
pragmatism. Although I have been accused of being a particularly
harsh critic," in fact, I will suggest that pragtivism, while flawed, is
not so shallow. To work our way to that point, we need to begin by
understanding the outlines of the pragmatic philosophy that
spawned so many disciples.
Logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce gave birth to
pragmatism in the late 1800s."5 Although my definition here relies
on a number of early pragmatic philosophers and later
interpretations, Pierce deserves special credit, first, for originating
the ideas of pragmatism, and second, for foreseeing the way that
his philosophy could be easily taken hostage by "kidnappers."16 In
1905, Pierce renamed his philosophy "pragmaticism" to distinguish
it from emerging variants and, since he believed the new word was
ugly, to deter future appropriation. This portends the future
misuse of the term pragmatism, but it also suggests that there is not
much commonality between Pierce's work and that of later
pragmatists. Yet there is a core to this philosophy.
Pragmatism starts with a critical approach to the very idea of
truth and knowledge. Whereas others might argue that we can
reason our way to absolute knowledge about the world, and about
what is right and wrong, pragmatists reject this foundationalism."
Using the field of environmental ethics as a case study, it is easy to
41. The Nature Conservancy is the largest environmental non-profit by both revenue and
employees. The 100 Largesl U.S. Charities, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/top-charities/list/
#tab:rank [https://perma.cc/ZA8-D9Q6] (last visited May 15, 2017).
42. MARK R. TERCEK & JONATHAN S. ADAMS, NATURE'S FORTUNE: How BUSINESS AND
SOCIETY Ti IRIVE BY INVESTING IN NATURE, at xvii (2013) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at xiv, 195.
44. Josh Fortenbery, Editor's Note, The Discourse on Environmentalism, 42 ENvTL. L. i, ii
(2016).
45. TALISSE & AIKEN, supra note 37, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Parker, supra note 36, at 22.
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see the importance of the pragmatic rejection of foundationalism.
In environmental ethics we often see two competing views of
reality. One side insists that nature has intrinsic rights."9 The other
side argues that nature does not have any rights: it is humans who
have rights, and if nature has any value, it is only for human
purposes." The pragmatist says that it is foolish to believe that
either of these statements is absolutely true." In any case, even if
we could prove that one "truth" was real and the other was false,
that doesn't necessarily have any influence on our actions. What
is more important is which beliefis more useful.3
Another way to look at the issue of foundationalism is through
the common means-end distinction. Relying on this distinction
suggests that there are some "fixed, final ends objectively
grounding the entire field of human striving."54  Pragmatism
eschews the distinction because it rejects such a certain and
externally-driven conception of reality.55 Instead, pragmatists argue
that agents (human or otherwise) set the course of progress, not an
independent and unflinching truth that exists apart from the
agent.56 Even if such a truth does exist, our inability to fully define
it makes it of little use in practical action. As Richard Posner has
said, "The pragmatist's real interest is not in truth at all, but in
beliefjustified by social need."5 7
Understanding the rejection of both foundationalism and the
related means-ends distinction leads naturally to a second pillar of
pragmatism: pluralism. Because there is no single truth, no
foundation that we dispute, we are obliged to recognize a
multitude of different, perhaps even competing, perspectives and
beliefs.58 These are not just different ways of describing the same
underlying belief, but different ways of valuing actions and
outcomes.59 For example, we may enjoy nature because it satisfies
49. Weston, supra note 1, at 322.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Desautels-Stein, supra note 1, at 579.
53. Id.
54. Weston, supra note 1, at 321.
55. Id. at 322.
56. Id.
57. Posner, supra note 1, at 1656.
58. TALISSE &AIKEN, supra note 37, at 114.
59. Id. at 113-14.
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our intellectual curiosity,60 protects our health, or because it is
beautiful . In each of these cases, I am describing the way nature
is valued by humans for human purposes. But if we say we should
protect nature because it has the right to exist, then we are valuing
nature for nature's sake. If we say, as the pragmatist must, that we
can value nature for the many ways that it benefits people and that
humans must protect nature because nature has its own rights,
then we are embracing pluralism.6 2  Both ways of valuing and
deciding on action are acceptable. Sometimes they may compete,
other times they may cooperate, but there is no way to justify, a
priori, one method of acting over the other.6
Determining which values are best or which techniques are most
effective is left to experience rather than fixed rules. A utilitarian
or consequentialist might argue that any action that promotes
overall wellbeing is appropriate." A deontologist would conversely
argue that final wellbeing is not the touchstone and that instead,
we must act according to certain exogenous duties that describe
some behavior as appropriate and other behavior as
inappropriate.65  The pragmatist says that we look to social goals
and our past experience and simply ask which efforts have worked
in the past and which can plausibly work in the future. In this
respect, experience is also a central component of pragmatism.
Philosophical pragmatism emerged shortly after Charles Darwin's
explanation of evolution by natural selection and as the role of
science and the scientific method were gaining new popularity.6 7
Thus, it is easy to see how experience, capitalizing on what works
while discarding what does not, could emerge as a key component
of philosophical pragmatism.
The final remaining inquiry into philosophical pragmatism, and
perhaps the most important, is how to define goals-even if they
are merely subjective goals rather than final, objective ends. It is
democracy, according to John Dewey, that is the caldron in which
60. EDWARD L. MCCORD, THE VALUE OF SPECIES, at 9 (2012).
61. Andrew Light, Environmental Pragmatism as Philosophy or Metaphilosophy? On the Waton-
Katz Debate, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra note 1, at 328.
62. Id.
63. TALISSE &AIKEN, supra note 37, at 113-14.
64. Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
ethics-deontological [https://perma.cc/36AY-B2SD] (last updated Oct. 17, 2016).
65. Id.
66. Parker, supra note 36, at 25-26.
67. Id. at 23.
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goals and values are conjured, established, communicated, tested,
and ultimately implemented.6 ' But to Dewey, democracy is much
more than just voting; it is, essentially, communication among the
public.69 Democracy is notjust the actions of political agencies; it is
an organized and intentional public.70  To express values and
desires that are legitimate progress, not merely shorthand
reflections of old symbols and lingering expectations, democracy
requires contemporaneous experience and dialogue.7' Democracy
is voting, and it is political agencies, but those things alone can
amplify failures,7 2 so the public must come together in all its
diversity and clearly communicate demands for progress. These
demands, emergent from robust democratic participation, are the
criteria by which values, progress, and good are established in
philosophical pragmatism.
Robust democratic engagement has a parallel benefit for
pragmatism in addition to its role in goal setting. A
communicative, community-oriented, engaging democratic
experience is also satisfying to the public.7" Thus, Dewey's
democracy is a substrate that both produces appropriate social
goals, that is, progressive community values toward which society
can strive in the absence of an independent and fixed fundamental
ends, while it also creates public satisfaction. This satisfaction does
not imply that there is public consensus on goals, merely that
because the public is engaged and confident in Dewey's democratic
system, there is greater satisfaction even with outcomes that do not
correspond to the values of each and every individual.
Environmental activists can easily promote this robust
democracy, facilitating communications that result in reasonably
definite goals, amplifying those goals, and translating them into
policy options for the political state. The state itself is often forced
to act before any democratic resolution emerges, which makes
administrative decisionmaking somewhat more difficult. Many
perspectives, implicitly or explicitly tied to pragmatism, have
68. See genemay JOHN DEWEY, TiHE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
INQUIRY (Melvin L. Rogers ed., Penn State Press 2012).
69. Id. at 118.
70. Id. at 119.
71. Id. at 118.
72. Id. at 119.
73. Parker, supra note 36, at 27-28.
74. DEWEY, supra note 68, at 158-60.
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emerged over the past century to offer a framework for
administrative and judicial decisionmaking. I next touch on just
two: Charles Lindblom's "muddling through" and Richard Posner's
economic legal pragmatism.
C. Administrative Decisionmaking: Muddling Through
Charles Lindblom introduced "Muddling Through" in 1959.
Although he did not reference philosophical pragmatism or any of
its proponents by name, he did capture several components of
pragmatism. What makes Lindblom's muddling important is that it
seems to represent a point on the path from rigorous philosophical
pragmatism to more superficial pragtivism. This is not a
condemnation of Lindblom's work, which he intended to be as
much a description of administrative decisionmaking, as a
prescription for improvement.7 6 It is a recognition that in applying
something as broad and optimistic as philosophical pragmatism,
there may need to be techniques for doing as much as we can in the
absence of all the resources needed to do the best we can. This gap
between what we strive for and what we can achieve is nowhere
more obvious than in the administrative state about which
Lindblom wrote.
Muddling begins with a problem: When an administrator is
responsible for developing a policy, if she wants to develop the
ideal policy, she has an impossible task.78  To shape an ideal
outcome she would need to
list all related values in order of importance . . . . Then all possible
policy outcomes could be rated as more or less efficient in attaining a
maximum in these values. This would of course require a prodigious
inquiry into values held by members of society and an equally
prodigious set of calculations on how much of each value is equal to
how much of each other value.
79
75. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 79
(1959).
76. See Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 Pun. ADMIN. REv. 517, 524
(1979) ("That complex problems cannot be completely analyzed and that we therefore
require strategies for skillful incompleteness still seems close to obvious to me.").
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If our administrator could manage these first two steps, in her
third step she "would undertake systematic comparison of [her]
multitude of alternatives to determine which attains the greatest
amount of values."so Having done that, the administrator could
"take advantage of any theory available that generalized about the
classes of policies" she might ultimately implement. And finally,
based on all this assessment, she "would try to make the choice that
would in fact maximize [her] values."8 2
Complicated? That is exactly Lindblom's point. The step-by-step
caricature of ideal decisionmaking here is what scholars-and
perhaps pragmatists-prefer to describe, but it is no way to actually
make progress because people do not have the time, money,
intellect, or even desire to make it a reality."
The reality of practical administrative decisionmaking according
to Lindblom is much simpler. It is muddling through. With this
approach, our administrative decisionmaker begins by setting out a
"principal objective" and then compares that objective to other
policy objectives that might complicate the principal." For
example, an administrator may identify reduction of carbon
dioxide as the principal objective and might clearly see that
continued growth of the carbon-based economy is a competing
goal. By looking at the decisionmaking process more owlishly, the
administrator is free to "disregard most other social values as
beyond [her] present interest, and [she] would for the moment
not even attempt to rank the few values that [she] regarded as
immediately relevant."8 5 She would accept and admit that she has
to disregard many important factors, even some that might be
related to her principal objective.6  The administrator would
certainly ignore, for example, the politics of a minor oil producing
nation, which may be relevant but distant. But she likely would
consider the price and availability of coal, which is much more




83. Id. at 80.
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Our administrator would next roughly detail the various policy
options that seem most realistic.87 Perhaps she will consider a cap
and trade system, a carbon tax, a technology requirement, or a
fixed emissions rate. In coming up with such ideas and comparing
them, the administrator would not dive deeply into a body of
theory, but would instead look to familiar past experiences, thereby
judging the fit of new policies to the new situation." How, she
might ask, have technology standards worked with respect to clean
water or other air pollutants? Have cap and trade systems or taxes
been used and led to reductions in the past? Do they properly
balance competing interests?"9  Based on these inquiries, the
administrator selects a specific policy knowing that she will only
partially achieve her goals and will need to iterate through this
same process to incrementally approach a more transformational
policy change.90
This is muddling through. It is a process of cabined and
incremental decisionmaking that takes account of ideal goals and
the human capacity to balance all of them. It recognizes that
countervailing pressures and information deficiencies, as well as
human processing ability, make transformative policy difficult and
therefore allows for step-wise progress as long as there is also a
willingness to review outcomes and repeat the process as necessary.
The similarities to and differences from philosophical
pragmatism should be obvious. First, muddling accepts pluralism
by recognizing the competing values, none of which can be
objectively selected as the one true value.9' Second, muddling at
least minimizes the means-ends distinction by focusing on
incrementalism rather than a direct jump to an ultimate and
foundational end.92 Third, muddling puts a substantial value on
experience and applying policies that have worked in the past and
seem likely to work under current conditions.3 Fourth and finally,
muddling gives significant weight to democracy and even public




90. Id. at 80.
91. Id. at 81.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 79.
94. Id. at 81.
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because muddling recognizes the importance of democracy but
attempts to act even when it is impossible to understand the
democratic preference. As Lindblom concedes, "preferences
have not been registered on most issues; indeed, there often are no
preferences in the absence of public discussion sufficient to bring
an issue to the attention of the electorate."6
I want to emphasize, again, that muddling is explicitly limited to
administrative decisionmaking and is not a model for advocacy.
This is not to say that advocacy cannot benefit from Lindblom's
many insights, but simply that the roles of the administrator and
the advocate are quite different. Twenty years after he wrote "The
Science of 'Muddling Through,"' Lindblom wrote a follow-up to
further detail his perspective. In "Still Muddling, Not Yet
Through," he offers an explicit role for activists in his paradigm.9"
Lindblom reasons that the role of advocates in policy analysis drives
effective muddling at the administrative level."9 Interest groups, he
explains, contribute partisan analysis that is the "most productive"
part of incremental political decisionmaking.o00 Value and interest
"fragmentation" and "political interaction among many
participants ... are methods, in many circumstances, of raising the
level of information and rationality brought to bear on
[administrative] decisions."'0 '
Muddling is one clear intersection between philosophical
pragmatism and pragtivism, and that point deserves attention
because muddling has a specific and central role for political and
public advocacy. If muddling is to work-as an alternative to some
more holistic but unrealistic decisionmaking process-advocates
must advocate.102 That should go without saying, but given the
forthcoming description of pragtivism, and the increasing
prevalence of pragtivism in action, I think it does need saying.
95. Id. at 81-82.
96. Id.
97. Lindblom, supra note 76.




102. Apologies to the late William Safire, who I am sure would have said that "advocates
must advocate" is a tautophrase no better than Taylor Swift's "haters gonna hate," or, for that
matter, Gertrude Stein's "rose is a rose is a rose." William Safire, Tautophrases, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., May 7, 2006, at 22. Alas, as later portions of this Article will demonstrate, I am
skeptical that the nature of an advocate is so obvious to some pragtivists.
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Muddling makes decisionmaking more realistic and achievable
by simplifying the process.10 3  It diverges from pragmatism in
particular, however, because it tries to simplify while pragmatism
cautions that democracy, philosophy, and decisionmaking should
be a "struggle" and "must always be a good fight."'0o But
Lindblom's muddling incrementalism does exemplify many of
pragmatism's key concepts. In particular, it is a form of practice
that seeks easier solutions without striving for purity or an
unrealistic unified theory of decisionmaking.o' In that respect, it
may remain a closer cousin of philosophical pragmatism than
Richard Posner's economic pragmatism, which I outline in the
following Section.
D. Judicial Decisionmaking: Posner's Pragmatism
I have made room for a brief review of Richard Posner's take on
pragmatism for two reasons. First, Posner is one of the key
contemporary figures to transfer pragmatism into law, particularly
into judicial decisionmaking.106  Second, Posner's version of
pragmatism is the beginning of a strange trend-central to Farber's
eco-pragmatism,'0 o Ruhl's radical middle,'08  and especially
pragtivism-in which behavior that calls itself pragmatic explicitly
creates a special pedestal for permanently fixing grand, unified
theory rather than relegating such dogmatism to the dustbin, or at
least the background, as philosophical pragmatism does. As we will
see, Posner's pragmatism creates a special place for a utilitarian law
and economics approach to decisionmaking. Likewise, in the
Sections that follow, I will explain how Farber and Ruhl elevate
economic, environmentalist, and ecological rationales for
environmental protection to special status while pragtivism seeks to
move environmental protection from one dogma that it
103. Lindblom, supra note 75, at 79-80.
104. Weston, supra note 1, at 339.
105. Lindblom, supra note 75, at 80.
106. Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism be Radical? Richard Posner and
Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 688 (2003) (reviewing (RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)) ("For well over a decade, Posner has been the leading
proponent of legal pragmatism.").
107. See infra Section II.E.
108. See infra Section IIF.
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"pragmatically" dismisses to another dogma that it un-pragmatically
and uncritically accepts. 1 0 9
Posner's pragmatism is distinct from what we have so far seen,
and will see next, because it is focused squarely on judicial
decisionmaking."0 Posner lays out what he sees as the three
elements of pragmatism, which should be familiar: (1) a distrust of
the certitudes of "truth," "reality," and "nature"; (2) the notion that
all propositions should "be tested by their consequences, by the
difference they make"; and (3) a commitment to judging laws by
their conformity to identified needs rather than by a test of
ideology or impersonal criteria."'
Posner integrates these elements into judicial assessments. First,
Posner asserts that ajudge's goal is not to describe natural law, but
to further the welfare of society."2  One interpretation of
furthering social welfare is establishing the expectation that 'judges
and legislators are officials of the same stripe-guided and
controlled by the same goals, values, incentives, and constraints." 113
This would certainly make judging "greatly simplified; [udging]
would be primarily a matter of helping the legislature forge sound
policy." 114 But Posner refuses to accept un-pragmatic foundations
of this nature and instead relies on his view of reality, that "the
legislative process is buffeted by interest-group pressures to an
extent rare in the judicial process. The result is a body of laws far
less informed by sound policy judgments than" once believed. "5
In this respect, Posner rejects a left-leaning dogma. Posner's
second pragmatic assertion is a criticism of right-leaning formalism.
"Pragmatism" he says, "remains a powerful antidote to
formalism.""6  Formalism, in this sense, is another simplifying
technique, but like the above critique of legislative intent,
formalism fails pragmatism because "[i] t asks not, What works?, but
109. These critiques are not necessarily meant as criticisms. I am not a philosopher so I
cannot fairly say that I identify as a philosophical pragmatist, and therefore I am not
comfortable arguing that a divergence from pragmatism is a per se flaw. Instead, I am
identifying these divergences in an effort to create a taxonomy of relevant ideas, their
relationships, and their possible origins.
110. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1657.
111. Id. at 1660-61.
112. Id. at 1657.
113. Id. at 1658.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1663.
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instead, What rules and outcomes have a proper pedigree in the
form of a chain of logical links to an indisputably authoritative
source of law . . ?" 117
With concepts like intent and formalism cut away, how does
Posner think a judge can determine what works? Here is where his
pragmatism diverges orthogonally from Dewey's. Rather than
democratic engagement, Posner's pragmatism measures progress
by "the idea that law should strive to support competitive markets
and to stimulate their results in situations in which market-
transaction costs are prohibitive ... because of the empirical
relation between free markets and human welfare.""" This, he
argues, is a pragmatic guidepost because it is not grounded in any
existing ethics,"' and because it is the best approach to the
"contemporary American legal system to follow, given what we
know about markets... , about American legislatures, about
American judges, and about the values of the American people."o
The centrality of the economic model is pragmatic in Posner's
judgment because it works and it works based on experience and
information. The risk, however, is that by identifying a specific
concept of progress it can easily become static and therefore lose its
pragmatic edge. One is certainly inclined to believe, given Posner's
previous work, that he came to pragmatism ex ante, as a defense of
law and economics and not the other way around."' As we move to
the environmental legal pragmatists, this chicken-and-egg question
is constantly lingering.
E. Farber's Eco-Pragmatism
Daniel Farber was a legal pragmatist before he was an eco-
pragmatist.122 But his book Eco-Pragmatisms23 merged the concepts
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1167.
119. Id. at 1667-68. I am not convinced that law and economics is not grounded, but it
may also be irrelevant to philosophical pragmatists. Even if this method is not "grounded in
the ethics of Kant or Rawls or Bentham or Mill or Hayek or Nozick," id., that does not mean
that it isn't a new dogma all its own.
120. Id. at 1668.
121. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 1, at 1025 (noting that Posner has "offer[ed] an
unyielding defense of wealth maximization as the Pole Star of ethics").
122. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331
(1988); Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the 21st Century, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 163 (1995).
123. FARBER, supra note 1.
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of environmental protection and pragmatism and spawned
significant new scholarship in environmental law.'12 1
Eco-pragmatism establishes itself on much the same principle
(but not foundation, of course) as philosophical pragmatism:
uncertainty. Environmental protection is largely a matter of
regulating risks.'12  Whatever fundamental truths may exist in the
world, even as we strive to know them, we are confronted by the
vast uncertainty that animates pragmatism. In much the same vein,
environmentalists-which in Farber's analysis make a broad swath
of the population126-want to mitigate long-run risks and are
constantly discovering new risks.127 Both the temporal scope and
advances of science that unveil new hazards introduce
uncertainty.'2" This uncertainty isn't exactly the same character as
metaphysical uncertainty since at each step Farber is willing to
accept "concrete realities," such as those scientific facts that are
necessary to help mitigate environmental risk once such risk is
deemed sufficiently likely. '2  But even in a world with some
discernable foundations, certain ideologies arise that offer easy
answers to complex problems.3 0 Challenging these easy answers,
Eco-Pragmatism continues down the philosophically pragmatic path
but veers slightly from the normal course.
Farber introduces what he sees as the two camps competing to
have their concept of reality, their easy answers, prevail: the
economically dogmatic "bean counters" and the politically positivist
"tree huggers." 131 These camps are familiar in the world of
environmental policy. On the one hand, you have those who
believe that economic efficiency, as measured by the public's
"willingness to pay," is the simple answer for determining good
environmental policy.1 3 2 If after a cost-benefit analysis a policy is
shown to maximize social welfare as measured by economic
124. Eg., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIc APPROACH (2004); Angelo, supra note 1; Grodsky, supra note 1;
Hirokawa, supra note 1; Mintz, supra note 1; Ruhl, supra note 1; Sinden, supra note 1;
Wildermuth, supra note 1.
125. FARBER, supra note 1, at 5.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 15.
130. Id. at 6, 35-36.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Id. at 39-42.
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efficiency, it is a good policy.13 3  The simple foundation is that
economic efficiency is the metric of "good." On the other hand,
you have those who believe that nature, however defined, has rights
that cannot be captured in dollars and cents (or at least has human
benefits that can only be captured theoretically, but not in
practice) and who, therefore, turn to political processes as the
simple answer to making collective decisions.13 4
The world of environmental policy, as characterized by eco-
pragmatism, is a never-ending battle over which belief system is
more reflective of the "real" human spirit, the "[w]illingness to pay
or the willingness to vote."'13  A large portion of Farber's book is
dedicated to exposing the flaws of both the bean counter and tree
hugger logic.'36 But those flaws are not relevant here. What is
relevant is the way Farber situates both perspectives in his eco-
pragmatism and what that says about the relationship between
philosophical and eco-pragmatism.
While pragmatism accepts that dogmas exist, it challenges those
dogmas not on their nuance, but on their existential claims to
either derive from or lead to an idealized foundation of knowledge
and behavior.'7 Legal pragmatism differs slightly because it deals
less in metaphysical realities, or the lack thereof, instead
substituting hard-and-fast legal rules as the dogmas that
pragmatism must reject.'18 It is understandable, then, that Farber's
eco-pragmatism differs from philosophical pragmatism insofar as,
after teasing apart and undermining the arguments of both the
bean counters and the tree huggers, Farber does not gloat in
having disproven yet another set of claims to truth. Instead, he
fashions a new constructive framework from his critical rubble.
Eco-pragmatism's method has one overarching and one
underlying principle. The overarching standard is that there is no
"purely mechanical method of deciding these difficult issues."'"3
Simplistic dogmas promise escape from tough choices, but they are
false promises."0 The underlying principle is that "society has basic
133. Id. at 40.
134. Id. at 43.
135. Id. at 42.
136. Id. at 35-69.
137. E.g., Parker, supra note 36, at 22; TALISSE & AIKEN, supra note 37, at 114.
138. E.g., FARBER, supra note 1, at 9-10.
139. Id. at 93.
140. Id.
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commitments, including one to environmental quality, and those
commitments should form the baseline for analysis."14 ' As with
Lindblom's muddling, which offers a simplification of
decisionmaking by, in part, starting with experience, Farber
proposes that we can at least partially simplify environmental
decisionmaking by starting with an environmental baseline
reflecting "the environmental norms that our society has
unmistakably embraced."'4 2  The practical implication of this
baseline is that whenever we begin analysis of a new environmental
problem, we must start by "requiring the strongest feasible efforts
to obtain environmental quality."'43 At the same time, we must
realize that the strongest feasible protections are sometimes
"grossly disproportionate to any plausible benefit. Thus, cost-
benefit analysis may serve as a useful backstop."4 4 This method
demands a presumption for strong environmental protection, "but
it is a rebuttable presumption." 145
It may not be obvious how the eco-pragmatic method will apply
in every situation, but it does have the benefit of being uniquely
comprehensible and useful. Lindblom offered a similarly
applicable method for decisionmaking, but where Lindblom's
muddling was mostly description, Farber's eco-pragmatism is mostly
prescription.'46
Eco-pragmatism captures many of the pieces of philosophical
pragmatism but, like Posner's pragmatism, it differs in one
significant way. Farber offers a pragmatic method that recognizes
the fallacies of rule-based, easy-answer ideologies.'47 But it then
carves out a space for exactly this type of thinking in its
framework.148  Of course, Farber never promises to be a strict
adherent to philosophical pragmatism, and he only hints at the
philosophy that underlies pragmatism in a few brief moments.'
As a whole, despite its short attention to philosophical
foundations, and one major divergence in its elevation of what we
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146. Id. at 206.
147. Id. at 43.
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149. Id. at 9-11, 15, 93.
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might call "flexible dogmas," Farber's eco-pragmatism does capture
the centrality of uncertainty and the resulting fallacy of simple
answers in philosophical pragmatism. But one other strand that
links eco-pragmatism to philosophical pragmatism is especially
interesting. Like Dewey's promise that democracy is both
substantively important and procedurally satisfying, Farber also
recognizes the importance of having a method that builds
confidence and satisfaction. "The point of a baseline" he says,
speaking of the environmental baseline that colors eco-pragmatism,
"is not simply to control the results of cases, but also to leave us
satisfied with the process of reaching the result."o Even if results
turn out to be wrong when judged against new information, if a
pragmatic framework leaves people with the feeling that, "heck, at
least we did our best," then the framework is still a valuable one.
And then we have J.B. Ruhl's "radical middle." While I grant that
his tone may be tongue-in-cheek, as the following discussion
demonstrates, it is disruption and passion, rather than satisfaction,
that inspire the radical middle.
F. Ruhl's Radical Middle
J.B. Ruhl is a devotee of Farber's eco-pragmatism.15' Not only did
he author an admiring book review,'15 a few years later he authored
a "manifesto" that praised and carried the torch of eco-pragmatism,
but sought to take eco-pragmatism "a step further." 5 3 That work
was "A Manifesto for the Radical Middle."15' From it emerged a
more radicalized version of Farber's work, and it lends a distinct
impression that if Farber is the lover, Ruhl is the fighter. But what
is most important about Ruhl's version of pragmatism is not how it
relates to Farber, but how it relates to pragtivism. As this Section
attempts to show, Ruhl's radical middle is the best link between the
more academic pragmatisms so far discussed and pragtivism, which
concludes this Part.
150. Id. at 113.
151. J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in
Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 545-46 (2000) [hereinafter New (Pragmatist)
Middle] (reviewing FARBER, supra note 1).
152. Id.
153. Manifesto, supra note 2, at 387.
154. Id.
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Searching for a way to describe and mend the deep ideological
divisions in environmental policy, Ruhl describes three types of
"middle"-places where different positions might come together-
in environmentalism. The first middle is the passive middle, the
middle over which the pendulum of extremism frequently swings,
but never stops.1 5 1 On the one side, Ruhl identifies Deep
Ecology,'"6  while on the other is the anti-environmental157
sentiments of former Secretary of the Interior James Watt.'5" This
passive middle is "whatever the annihilation process" from the war
between the likes of Deep Ecology and Watt, "leaves behind."1 5 9 It
"lacks any coherent philosophy."0̀
The second middle is the resistive middle. The resistive middle is
younger but also more self-sufficient. It is the process of "picking
and choosing policies from among" the dominant extremes.'61 To
exemplify the resistive middle, Ruhl points to sustainable
development, the idea that environment, economy, and justice
must not be separate.162 Central to the resistive middle is an active
defense of its policies against extremists.163
The third and final middle is the aggressive middle, which,
confusingly, Ruhl uses synonymously with "radical middle." 6 4
Unlike his other two middles, defined by tactics and then enriched
with examples, the radical middle is both tactical and substantive.
Tactically, the radical middle "is not simply a compromise position.
It advances a philosophy independent of the two extremes."65 The
radical middle is an aggressive challenge to the status quo.'6  But,
substantively, the radical middle is very specifically ecosystem
155. Id. at 391.
156. Id. at 389.
157. Watt is also notorious for his anti-woman, Jewish, -disabled, and -African American
sentiments. Speaking of the diversity in his ranks, he once quipped, "We have every kind of
mixture you can have. I have a black, I have a woman, two Jews and a cripple. And we have
talent." Steven R. Weisman, Watt Quits Post; President Accepts with 'Reluctance', N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1983, at Al.
158. Manifesto, supra note 2, at 391.
159. New (Pragmatist) Middle, supra note 151, at 523.
160. Id.
161. Manifesto, supra note 2, at 393.
162. Id. at 391-92.
163. Id. at 393.
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management, "a new idea that the middle hatched on its own." 6 7
Very generally speaking, ecosystem management is an adaptive
management approach that conserves nature in whole parts,'
rather than in one-off, immutable species protections, which Ruhl
claims are central to the tree hugger dogma.'69
Like Posner's economism, ecosystem management may be a wolf
in sheep's clothing. Although Ruhl implies that ecosystem
management is a policy invention of the Clinton administration,o7 0
it is more properly described as an idea that emerged from the
ecological sciences, at least as far back as 1988.171 It is, however, a
normative structure to "manage so as not to deny future
generations the opportunities and resources we enjoy today."1 7 2 It
is indeed a structure that draws on a number of tools, which Ruhl
elaborates by describing the information, models, and dynamics
that are part of the equation. ' And I agree that the tools are
robust and valuable. But according to Ruhl, the radical middle of
ecosystem management is "its own world view based on its own set
of principles. It is not a recipe or amalgam, but an independently-
devised, scientifically-based policy position in its own right." 7 4 One
could say exactly the same of Watt, of course, or Deep Ecology-
Ruhl's un-pragmatic foils. Regardless of its breadth, when a single
instrument is presented as the proper tool for resolving
environmental disputes, it is likely too fundamentalist to be
properly pragmatic. At the very least, when a single instrument is
presented, and presented in contrast to alternatives, it becomes
very susceptible to migrating from a flexible process to a dogmatic
goal. The history of cost-benefit analysis in environmentalism is
one such example.'7 5
167. Id. at 394.
168. Id. at 394-96.
169. Id. at 390.
170. Id. at 394.
171. Norman L. Christensen et al., The ileport of the Ecological Society of America Committee on
the Scientific Basis for Ecosysterm Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 668 (1996)
(listing select definitions of ecosystem management, with the earliest from 1988).
172. Id. at 667.
173. Manifeto, supra note 2, at 399-403.
174. Id. at 398.
175. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND TIHE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010); SHAPIRO &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 124.
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A final characteristic of the radical middle that distinguishes it
from philosophical pragmatism-but affiliates it with pragtivism-is
its reliance on expertise over public engagement. Expertise is
essential to environmental protection, and pragmatism, insofar as
expertise helps identify problems and solutions, and allows us to
look back and assess the effectiveness of the tested solutions. But
expertise at the expense of democracy is unsatisfying under
Dewey's and Farber's pragmatism. Unfortunately, "public
participation," Ruhl says, "has become not the engine of policy
deliberation, but an impediment." 176 Recognizing the risk that the
radical middle could fail to gain public trust if it does not engage
public values, Ruhl offers transparency and access to data as
consolation. These are critical components of any pragmatic
system, but are they substitutes? If a cabal of political scientists
determined that they would appoint the U.S. President every four
years without a vote, but would livestream their deliberations, I
doubt that would "leave us satisfied with the process of reaching the
result."78
Pragtivism, finally, the last in our exploration of pragmatism's
manifestations, may most resemble Ruhl's radical middle in that it
defines itself by its foils, does not embrace democratic engagement,
and may be substituting one "grand theory" of policymaking for
another. But to Ruhl's credit, he has thoughtfully and forcefully
defined his thinking over the years, while pragtivism is hard to pin
down because it is not so self-reflective.
G. Pragtivism
I am coining a new term because I want to describe a strategy, a
way of thinking, that is different from philosophical pragmatism
and vernacular pragmatism but is nevertheless a consistent
ideological approach to environmental activism. To define this
term I could describe any number of actors, both inside and
outside the environmental field, as pragtivists. But for the purposes
of this Article, I am focusing on two organizations and their
leadership-The Nature Conservancy ("TNC") under Mark Tercek
as well as the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") led by Fred
Krupp-primarily because they have provided a more complete
176. Manifesto, supra1 note 2, at 404-05.
177. Id. at 405.
178. FARBER, supra note 1, at 113.
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written record that is accessible and descriptive of their ideologies.
I also focus on these organizations because of their unremitting use
of the word "pragmatic" in their self-descriptions.'7 9
Pragtivists are most distinct from the other pragmatisms because
they are not proposing a method for administrative or judicial
decisionmaking but for environmental advocacy. This
environmental pragtivism is characterized by both a fixed belief
and by a set of tactics. The belief is that environmental protection
is essential. 180 As EDF clearly states, "While our tactics vary, our
mission never does: a healthier environment and a sustainable
future."'8 1 Mark Tercek is equally explicit when he says "[a]ll our
action must heed and respect nature."82
Tactically, environmental pragtivists rely on a set of tools that are
defined, in large part, by how they differ from traditional
environmentalist tools. Fred Krupp has described the "reactive
opposition" of traditional environmentalism,8 3 willing to "stand[]
in the way of growth and drive [] up costs."' At The Nature
Conservancy, former lead scientist Peter Kareiva has characterized
the "environmentally facile stance" of traditionalism, and activism,
as a hopeless "heroic stand .. . in the spirit of the lone
environmentalist who has chained him or herself to a tree."'85
Mark Tercek, likewise, says "[e]nvironmentalists generally believe
in nature's inherent value."'86 And this, he worries, can "alienat[e]
179. A search for variants of the word "pragmatism" on The Nature Conservancy's
website returned 230 results. A search on the Environmental Defense Fund's website
returned 134. By contrast, a search of the Natural Resources Defense Council's website
returned only 92 results. Also by contrast, both TNC and EDF used "pragmatic" to define
themselves, as evidenced in the citations in this Section, while NRDC used the word primarily
to describe others. (Searches conducted June 8, 2016.)
180. E.g., Eric Pooley, 15 Years of "Ways That Work"for People and Planet, ENvTL. DEF. FUND
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.edf.org/blog/2014/09/12/15-years-ways-work-people-and-
planet [https://perma.cc/PPQ7-ZRU6]; About Us: Vision and Mission, NATURE CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org/about-us/vision-mission/index.htm?intc=nature.tnav.about
[https://perma.cc/M7F2-N23J] (last visited May 15, 2017).
181. Pooley, supra note 180.
182. TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at 198.
183. Frederic D. Krupp, Opinion, New Environmentalism Factors in Economic Needs, WALL
STREETJ., Nov. 20, 1986, at 34.
184. Fred Krupp, Opinion, A New Climate-Change Consensus, WALL STREETJ., Aug. 6, 2012,
at A13.
185. Peter Kareiva, Conservation Science: How the Conservancy Leads with Science, NATURE
CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/science-in-action/leading-with-science/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/HSS9-4YPX] (last visited May 15, 2017).
186. TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at xvii.
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potential supporters" and cabin environmentalists' own "ability to
reach a broader audience and to mine sources of new ideas."87
More bluntly, he says that "the business guys are pretty smart. It's
the environmentalists ... who have more to learn here.""ss
Pragtivism describes itself as a challenge to reactive opposition,
facile heroism, and alienation, so one can be forgiven for thinking
that at the same time it is a call for more compromise. Pragtivists
are explicit that they are not aiming for compromise.189 Pragtivism
is more proactive than mere compromise, because it sees itself as a
third way rather than a hybrid way.'90 In practice, however, and as
discussed more in Part V, attempting to create a workable third way
ultimately results in frequent compromise.
Pragtivists focus on non-confrontational corporate partnerships
and collaboration (sometimes even replacing external activism with
internal consulting, cutting out the government and public
entirely),"' economic and market-based programs,'9 2 science,1 9 3
and more broadly changing the general impression of
environmentalism.'94 To the pragtivists, these tools have a series of
benefits. Corporate partnerships and voluntary programs are
efforts to push those with environmental footprints to be protective
without mandates, or even to go beyond mandates, unlike the
187. Id.
188. Greg Hanscom, Nature's CEO: Mark Tercek Says Conservation Is Good for Business, GRIST
(May 15, 2013), http://grist.org/cities/natures-ceo-mark-turcek-says-conservation-is-good-
for-business [https://perma.cc/DRF7-XJ4B].
189. Krupp, supra note 183 (writing that his ideas are "in no sense a move toward
compromise").
190. Id.
191. E.g., TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at 165-87; About Us: Protecting the Lands and
Waters on Which All Life Depends, NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/T7ZV-XTXT] (last visited May 15, 2017).
192. E.g., Krupp, supra note 183; Fred Krupp, The Making of a Market-Minded
Environmentalist, STRATEGY+BUSINESS (June 10, 2008), http://www.strategy-business.com/
article/08201?gko=97ea9 [https://perma.cc/CB3L-2D9M] [hereinafter Making of a Market-
Minded Environmentalist].
193. E.g., Kareiva, supra note 185. Somewhat humorously, Krupp has shown a little
confusion at the exact nature of science, confusing empiricism with anecdote. After
recounting the story of a business leader describing how his business could profit from
market-based regulations, Krupp joyfully wrote, "At that moment, my enthusiasm for market-
based environmentalism grew 10-fold. Because here, in the real world, was empirical evidence
that these ideas were as powerful as we'd dreamed." Making of a Market-Minded
Environmentalist, supra note 192 (emphasis added).
194. Making of a Market-Minded Environmentalist, supra note 192.
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command-and-control demands of traditional environmentalism.195
Market-based approaches can be either based on a regulatory
platform, in which there are caps on pollution or extraction, or on
a cost-internalization platform, in which a tax or fee is added to
account for the costs of environmental damage, but both provide
flexibility.' 96 The role of science in pragtivism is a little harder to
nail down, but it may well be a critique of the straw traditional
environmentalist who is willing to regulate out of sheer precaution,
regardless of the real risks.'9 7 Perhaps most importantly, pragtivism
wants to change the tenor of environmentalism, changing the
perception of environmentalists in an effort to push past the
traditional debates that have slowed environmental progress."
This last factor is undoubtedly the one with the clearest mark of
philosophical pragmatism. Pragtivists recognize a value divide,
which they believe is based on fallible dogmatic beliefs about the
world. '9 Recognizing this counterproductive foundationalism,
pragtivists can address pluralism by removing value from the
environmental debate, or by relying on multiple values.200  They
can remove value by focusing on what they identify as more value-
neutral tools, and win-win solutions,2 "' but they can also introduce
any tools that work because they are not beholden to any
positivism.202
195. Id.; TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at 167; Krupp, supra note 184; Pooley, supra
note 180.
196. TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at 136-37; Krupp, supra note 183; Pooley, supra
note 180.
197. See Kareiva, supra note 185 (stating that "[o]ur science is intensely pragmatic" and
that "none of our assumptions go unchallenged"); see also SHAPIRO & GLCKSMAN, supra note
124, at 2 ("Since the 1970s, risk regulation has come increasingly under vigorous attack....
The mantra of these criticisms is that risk regulation is 'irrational' . . . because regulators too
often address problems that pose minimal risks to the public or the environment.").
198. TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at 187, 197; Making of a Market-Minded
Environmentalist, supra note 192; Krupp, supra note 183.
199. TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at xv-xvii, 197-98; Krupp, supra note 183.
200. See TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at xv ("Valuing nature does not mean replacing
one set of compelling arguments for conservation with another, but it provides an additional
and important rationale for supporting the environment.").
201. See, e.g., About Us: Protecting the Lands and Waters on Which All Life Depends, supra note
191 ("We pursue non-confrontational, pragmatic solutions to conservation challenges.");
Pooley, supra note 180 ("It's clear that the pursuit of profit is an enormously powerful force
in the modern world, and so we often seek to create conditions where investors, inventors
and entrepreneurs ... have an economic incentive to protect the environment.").
202. See TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at xv.
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But again, all of this is done with at least one foundational
ideology at the center of pragtivist belief: environmental
protection. Pragtivists do not rebuff all foundationalism, because
they still accept the need to protect the environment without
reference to a method for determining what goals are valid.
Tercek, however, has expressed the most philosophically pragmatic
view on this issue, writing that all the various values are valid, from
the inherent rights of nature to nature as an economic engine.203
But it is enough, I think, to say that pragtivism does accept at least
one underlying certainty: the environment is important.
Where pragtivists differ from Posner, and others, is that they do
not offer a method for determining which of their various tools are
most appropriate under any given circumstance. Posner's
economic ideology includes the goal of unfettered markets and the
method, cost-benefit analysis. Farber and Ruhl give us a dynamic
integration of feasibility analysis and cost-benefit analysis or an
application of ecosystem management, respectively. Pragtivism just
offers a litany of tools but no guidance on how to apply them.0 4
For example, Tercek tells the story of a Dakio Paul, a fisherman
on the Pacific island of Pohnpei.20' The story, which Tercek offers
as a great success, reaches its apex when Dakio sets out with a gun
and a small boat to guard a fishery that the government and
community won't protect.20 6 It is a provocative story, but it leaves
the reader wondering two things. First, isn't this sort of self-help
more tantamount to command-and-control regulation than
partnership or incentive-based conservation? And how is an
aspirational pragtivist to know when to get a corporate partner to
help, when to call a scientist, when to lobby government, or when
to load a gun?
One last point on pragtivism's relationship to other pragmatisms.
There is an implicit tendency in pragtivism, like the one explicit in
Ruhl's radical middle, to reduce the role of democracy and public
input. Unlike Ruhl's approach, this is not an intentional challenge
203. Id. at xiv-xv.
204. See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 124, at 154 ("Even among those, including
some major national environmental groups, which enforce incentive-based techniques such
as emissions trading as a valuable method of regulatory compliance, the appropriate mix of
more traditional regulatory devices (such as performance standards) and incentive-based
techniques nevertheless remains a matter of ongoing debate.").
205. TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at 107.
206. Id. at 109.
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to the inefficiency of the non-expert public sticking its value-laden
nose into a technical process. Rather, pragtivism's reliance on win-
win situations, usually negotiated as voluntary and incentive based
programs, take place outside of the regulatory process that is
studded with opportunities for public comment, data review, and
even lawsuits. For example, EDF's early foray into a corporate
partnership with McDonald's resulted in the company's reduced
use of polystyrene, but the public and government were both
excluded from that negotiation, which was tantamount to a
consultant-client relationship, and, of course, the public didn't
have a chance to sue either party if they were unhappy with the
outcome.207 More broadly speaking, the very idea of a win-win
solution implies that there is no need for a public debate because
nobody has anything at risk: there are just environmental and
economic benefits for all.
This rosy picture of environmental protection achieved through
win-win solutions may be another positivist foundation inherent in
pragtivism. The intuition is natural that win-win is better than
conflict and regulation, but when an intuition becomes a driver of
environmentalist decisionmaking without serious questioning, it
amounts to yet another un-criticized dogma.
The common thread between the three environmental strands of
pragmatism is that all three have a substantive outcome
orientation, environmental protection, integrated into their
frameworks. This sets them apart from philosophical pragmatism
and muddling, which are strongly method oriented. Nevertheless,
it is important to notice that both Farber and Ruhl offer methods
that don't necessarily lead to more environmental protection.
Their versions of pragmatism err on the side of protection-they
integrate protection as one goal, even a default goal-but they do
not demand protection as an outcome. Pragtivism is distinctly
different. It is the only pragmatism in this typology with a specific
goal in mind.
Recognizing pragtivism's explicit outcome orientation, we have
to ask how that plays out in the real world. Certainly there have
been incredible success stories. EDF was instrumental in
developing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 that
207. McDonald's Reduces Waste-and Saves Money, ENvTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/partnerships/mcdonalds [https://perma.cc/G4HB-75ZA] (last visited
May 15, 2017).
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incorporated an acid rain trading program, which reduced sulfur
dioxide concentrations by seventy-two percent.20s But there are
also failures. Empirical research suggests that voluntary corporate
environmental practices have little environmental impact,209 and
the effort to institute a carbon dioxide trading program in 2009
based on a corporate-environmentalist partnership, in which EDF
was also a leader, was a spectacular bust. 210
The story of the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard is another such story,
much smaller in scale and much further under the radar. In a
sense, the Lizard story is unfair, as it is such a dramatic failure of
environmental protection. Likewise, no environmental group was
behind the initiation of this debacle-though they were certainly
behind the general regulatory strategy that led to it-and the dirty
politics are perhaps more insidious than normal. But that is exactly
why it makes a good example. The Environmental Defense Fund
offered its support for the industry-led conservation plan because
of what the plan represented as opposed to what it achieved (not
very pragmatic). And just like pointing to the 1990 acid rain
program as a great success, pointing to this failure can help us
explore the contrast more clearly.
III. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO AN UNCOMPROMISING LIZARD
Scientists discovered the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard (the "Lizard")
in 1968.211 In 1982, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS" or the "Service") classified the Lizard as a "Category 2"
species, meaning that it was probably in need of Endangered
Species Act ("ESA") protections, but the scientific information on
the species was still too thin to support such a final designation.212
For nearly thirty years the Lizard's legal status was in limbo as it
flipped and flopped between different FWS definitions," until,
spurred by a 2002 petition from the environmental group Center
208. Pooley, supra note 180.
209. See infra Section IV.B.
210. E.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, NAMING THE PROBLEM: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO COUNTER
EXTREMISM AND ENGAGE AMERICANS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING, at 3, 31
(2013).
211. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for Dunes





COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw
for Biological Diversity,2 14 FWS finally proposed listing the Lizard as
endangered in 2010.211
The Endangered Species Act mandates that FWS consider five
criteria when determining whether or not to list a species.216 The
criteria are, in summary: danger to the species' habitat; overuse of
the species; disease or predation on the species; inadequacy of
existing regulation; and other natural or man-made factors. 2 1 7
Addressing each factor, FWS found that habitat had decreased by
forty percent since 1982, habitat fragmentation due to oil and gas
operations was particularly acute,1 current state and federal
regulations, including an enforceable conservation plan covering
the Lizard's New Mexico habitat, did not sufficiently reduce threats
to the Lizard, 2 1  and pollution from oil and gas development
created a present and ongoing threat.22 0  According to these
various existing pressures and future threats, FWS explained that
an endangered listing was required.2 FWS then opened a sixty-
day comment period during which it would receive further input
on the proposed listing. 222
A. Political Preparations and Lack Thereof
Although the oil and gas industry and the State of Texas might
have started preparing to conserve the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard in
1982 when FWS first announced the likelihood of a listing, or in
2001 when FWS first described the Lizard's listing as high
priority,"2 or in 2002 when the Center for Biological Diversity
petitioned for listing, or in 2004 when the FWS again reiterated the
high priority for listing the Lizard, or even in 2010 as soon as
FWS proposed listing the Lizard, it was not until February 2012 that
Texas and the industry finally proposed a plan to conserve the
214. Id.
215. Id. at 77,801.
216. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(1 (A)-(E) (2012).
217. Id.
218. Proposed Listing, supra note 211, at 77,805.
219. Id. at 77,811.
220. Id. at 77,813.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 77,801.
223. Id. at 77,802.
224. Id.
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Dunes Sagebrush Lizard.22' To be clear, this is thirty years after
threats to the Lizard were first identified, but also two years and two
comment periods after FWS first proposed listing.
In the two years after the listing proposal and before the Texas
Conservation Plan, two critical political happenings took place. In
2011 Warren Chisum, then a Texas State Representative and
member of the Texas Oil and Gas Association, sponsored an
industry-backed amendment to an under-the-radar bill.22' The
purpose of the amendment was to move authority over endangered
species from the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department to the state
Comptroller, the office otherwise responsible for budget and fiscal
issues. 2 Not only did the new arrangement take responsibility
away from an organization with substantive expertise, it gave that
responsibility to an organization headed by Susan Combs, a vocal
opponent of the Endangered Species Act. 228
Once she was in control, Comptroller Susan Combs began
working with industry to craft the Texas Habitat Conservation Plan
for the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard ("Texas Plan," "Texas
Conservation Plan," or the "Plan") in an effort to avoid the
restrictions that would have come with FWS listing.2 ' Because the
Comptroller's office lacked environmental expertise, and perhaps
the will, to take responsibility for species conservation, the Texas
Plan had to rely on an outside organization to operate all facets
such as recruitment, monitoring, reporting, and mitigation work, as
necessary. Fortunately for the Comptroller, the same oil and gas
lobbyists who initially proposed transferring authority away from
Parks and Wildlife volunteered to establish a new nonprofit, run
225. See, e.g., Withdrawal, supra note 7, at 36,875 ("The comment period was then
reopened on February 24, 2012, in order for the Service to consider the Texas Conservation
Plan.") (internal citation omitted).




228. Dexheimer & Price, supra note 30. At least in the vernacular sense, moving
authority from one department to another in this way was a pragmatic amendment; the
industry wasn't beholden to old biases such as having subject-matter experts govern in their
areas of expertise. In order to achieve their goal of regulatory avoidance, they were willing
to do whatever worked.
229. Root, supra note 226.
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entirely by oil and gas lobbyists, to oversee Dunes Sagebrush Lizard
conservation.2 3 0
The Texas Habitat Conservation Foundation-with three board
members who were primarily employed as full time lobbyists for the
Texas Oil and Gas Association-launched in February 2012.
With the drafting of the Texas Conservation Plan and the new
nonprofit just off the ground, FWS determined that the Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard was no longer injeopardy.23 2
The Environmental Defense Fund immediately praised the
decision as "proof' that cooperative arrangements "can pay big
dividends for wildlife." 3 It is difficult to understand how an
agreement that had been in place for less than six months is proof
of anything. But more surprisingly, EDF called the Texas Plan a
"pro-active approach embraced here by industry,""23 1 ignoring the
three-decade delay and political machinations. This is pragtivism at
its weakest, advocating something simply because it looks like the
type of voluntary partnership and market-oriented approach that
EDF champions, but failing to critically review the details or
consider the signal that such support sends to the industry.
B. The Details of a Vague Plan
The Texas Conservation Plan itself is a 150-page document that
lays out a framework for oil and gas development in Lizard
habitat.2 35 The Plan, of course, because it is entirely voluntary, does
not apply to all landowners in Lizard habitat. Landowners may
decide whether to enroll and become subject to the Plan's
guidelines.3 Should they choose to enroll, they negotiate a
Certificate of Inclusion with the Texas Habitat Conservation
Foundation, which you will recall was created and run entirely by
oil and gas industry lobbyists. The Certificate includes all the
details and specific requirements for each landowner.3 This is a
critically important point. The Texas Plan lays out the broad
outlines of a conservation framework, but the detailed conservation
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Withdrawal, supra note 7, at 36,875.
233. Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, supra note 20.
234. Id.
235. TExAS PLAN, supra note 3.
236. Id. at 1.
237. Id.
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actions and any specific requirements, if any exist, are contained
only in individual Certificates of Inclusion, which, as described
below, are confidential even to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
As a general outline, the Texas Plan has two key components.
The first is the action plan, which lays out a structure of avoidance-
reclamation-minimization-mitigation.2 39  The Plan suggests that
developers first avoid development in Lizard habitat, in
conjunction with reclamation activities such as habitat
fragmentation reduction and removal of non-native invasive species
that impact the Lizard's habitat.24 0 If a participant chooses not to
avoid development in the Lizard's habitat, then the Plan
recommends that developers minimize their impacts on the Lizard
through a series of suggested conservation techniques .2 4  Finally, as
what FWS calls "a last resort," if the developer does destroy habitat
he must mitigate the loss of habitat2 2 through a market-based
243
mitigation-banking program.
The second major component of the Texas Plan is a habitat loss
ceiling, which may limit overall destruction of the Dunes Sagebrush
Lizard's habitat.244  Specifically, the Plan limits destruction to
21,257 acres of habitat (roughly ten percent) during the thirty-year
life of the Plan.
Although there are a number of more specific critiques of this
Plan, which are described in more detail in the litigation briefing
challenging the Plan,24 6 there are three shortcomings that deserve
special attention. The Texas Plan includes almost no mandatory
language; instead, it delegates enforceable promises to private
contracts, the critical details of Plan implementation are
confidential, and there is no incentive to comply with even the
vague guidance of the Plan.





243. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 73-87.
244. Id. at 58.
245. Id.
246. E.g., Complaint, supra note 21; Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Opposition to Defendants' and Defendant-Interveners' Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment, Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, 70 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 13-
0919); Initial Opening Brief of Appellants Defenders of Wildlife, Et Al., Defs. of Wildlife v.
Jewell, 815 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-5284).
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Rather than setting clear, mandatory standards for conservation,
the Plan is quite clear in its language that it should not limit the
operations of enrolled landowners. For instance, the Plan does not
address all activities in Lizard habitat. Rather, it addresses only
specifically defined "covered activities."2 17 Within these activities, it
provides a wide berth. When describing how the Plan will reduce
habitat loss, the Plan says, "In general, Covered Activities will be
conducted outside and away from DSL [Dunes Sagebrush Lizard]
Habitat when possible."21 8 With respect to fragmentation, the Plan
states: "it is expected that the consolidation and removal of lines
when possible may reduce habitat fragmentation. Some new
pipelines, flowlines, and power lines will be able to be routed
around DSL Habitat or use existing rights of way when possible."2
To address other man-made threats, "the Plan will encourage
appropriate Conservation Activities ... to reduce these impacts
when possible."""
If there are any enforceable standards that landowners must
follow, they are not included in the Plan. Rather, the Plan leaves
all the details of avoidance, conservation, and mitigation to each
specific Certificate of Inclusion-that is, to each individual
landowner who volunteers to participate in the Texas Plan.
The only apparent mandate actually included within the Plan
itself is the assurance that it will cap total habitat destruction at ten
percent. Even that, however, is a bit of an exaggeration. In fact,
the Plan promises that oil and gas development will not destroy
more than ten percent of "DSL Habitat."2 12 The Plan later defines
"DSL Habitat" as areas in which the Lizard has actually been found,
as opposed to habitat that is suitable for the Lizard. Thus, the
Plan does not limit destruction to ten percent of the Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard's total habitat, only to those habitat areas where
scientists have actually seen the Lizard. This is particularly
troubling since the Lizard is so small and difficult to find.
247. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 16.
248. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
249. Id. (emphasis added).
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 1.
252. Id. at 94.
253. Id. app.J at 2.
254. E.g., Withdrawal, supra note 7, at 36,872.
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There is also an argument that despite the language of the Plan,
which says it will limit destruction to ten percent of Lizard habitat,
the real intent and only enforceable interpretation is that the Plan
will limit destruction only to ten percent of voluntarily enrolled
habitat. The problem here is that whoever is responsible for
implementing the Plan will monitor only activities on enrolled
property and can only determine habitat destruction on those
properties. Thus, any habitat destruction outside the purview of
the Plan will be disregarded. At first blush this suggests that the
Plan will allow destruction of a smaller portion of the Lizard's
habitat, which would obviously be better for the Lizard. In fact,
however, landowners who enroll in the Plan are free to drop out at
their own pleasure because enrollment and continued engagement
with the Plan is entirely voluntary.255  Therefore, if the Plan
managers are monitoring only destruction of enrolled habitat, as
soon as the sum of habitat destruction on enrolled lands
approaches ten percent, the Plan managers could strategically ask
particularly destructive landowners to un-enroll from the Plan,
thereby creating more space under the ten percent cap.
Regardless of the various interpretations, even if the ten percent
cap is flawlessly designed and enforced, the Fish and Wildlife
Service has indicated that fragmentation, not simply habitat loss, is
a major contributor to the Lizard's decline. 2 5
Amplifying the underlying problem that there are no enforceable
mandates in the Plan and a constrained and questionable upper
limit to habitat destruction, the most significant problem is that all
the pertinent conservation details are totally confidential, even to
the Fish and Wildlife Service.5 As a consequence, the Certificates
of Inclusion, which contain the actual details of each landowner's
conservation promises, the names of the enrolled landowners,
whether there are any Lizards present on any enrolled property,
and even whether the property contains quality Lizard habitat, are
not available to the Fish and Wildlife Service.5
255. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 56. The incentive for enrollment is that if the Lizard
was listed, FWS could not impose any restrictions on enrolled landowners other than those
already imposed by the Plan. Because FWS chose not to list the Lizard, the incentive to
remain in the Plan is significantly diminished.
256. Proposed Listing, supra note 211, at 77,805.
257. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 403.454 (West 2015).
258. See TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 32.
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One cannot overstate the importance of this confidentiality
provision: it keeps the Fish and Wildlife Service completely in the
dark about the conservation requirements (as opposed to the mere
guidelines in the public Plan), the lands that must comply with
those requirements, and the presence or absence of the species
that those requirements are meant to protect. Without this
information, the Texas Plan is not only voluntary but also
unenforceable and amounts to nothing more than a vague
suggestion that the industry will self-govern.
While the threat of listing the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard as
endangered was certainly an incentive to create a plan, landowners
have no parallel incentive to carry out whatever vague promises
they may have made, because there is no mechanism or practical
opportunity for enforcement. And one should not forget that the
only authorities with access to the confidential conservation
promises and other relevant data are the Texas Comptroller-
charged with this responsibility at the behest of the Texas Oil and
Gas Association-and, initially, the Texas Habitat Conservation
Foundation-created by the Texas Oil and Gas Association and
governed by a three-member board comprised entirely of Texas Oil
and Gas Association lobbyists.
To see the startling inadequacy of the Texas Plan in action, one
need not look very far. After taking the helm of the Texas Habitat
Conservation Foundation, the three oil and gas lobbyists promised
to step away from their involvement with Plan implementation as
soon as they appointed a new board.25" They inauspiciously took
the first step in that process by appointing none other than Warren
Chisum, the former State Representative who was responsible for
transferring control over endangered species from the Parks and
Wildlife Department to the Comptroller. By the time he was
appointed chairman, Chisum had also become a lobbyist for the
Texas Oil and Gas Association." When asked if it made sense that
the oil and gas industry was implementing the Texas Plan, Chisum
explained that the industry should be in charge because they were
paying.26 1
As it turns out, Chisum and his compatriots performed just as
expected. For a number of years, the Texas Habitat Conservation
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Foundation was permitting enrolled landowners to destroy Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard habitat without performing any mitigation
efforts.6 It probably had little idea of how much mitigation was
required because the Foundation was also failing to conduct
monitoring to ensure that enrolled landowners were living up to
the requirements of their (completely confidential) Certificates of
Inclusion. 2
The environmental group Defenders of Wildlife has also
discovered serious shortcomings in the Texas Plan's
implementation. Periodically, the Texas Habitat Conservation
Foundation reported to the Texas Comptroller and then to the
Fish and Wildlife Service on the general activities under the Plan.
Defenders of Wildlife reviewed the reporting activity and noticed
that the reports explicitly said there were no compliance issues and
no reported habitat disturbances. Defenders of Wildlife used
Google Earth images to identify clear evidence of disturbances
within the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard's habitat. 266 At first the Texas
Comptroller denied that here had been any habitat disturbances,
but he later recanted and confirmed the unreported violations. 267
After all this failure, the Texas Comptroller finally decided to fire
the Texas Habitat Conservation Foundation in the spring of
2016.2' This is a move in the right direction and certainly removes
direct industry oversight over conservation. However, the
Comptroller is still the final authority on Plan implementation, not
the Fish and Wildlife Service, and matters of unenforceability and
confidentiality remain.
C. An Overabundance of Pragmatists
The Endangered Species Act didn't always make room for FWS
to consider voluntary agreements when considering the likely
future state of an at-risk species. Without rehashing all the details,
262. Dexheimer & Price, supra note 30.
263. Id.
264. YAwE LI ET AL., DEFS. OF WILDLIFE, HABITAT DISTURBANCES UNDER THE TEXAS
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE DUNES SAGEBRUSH LIZARD, at 3 (2013).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 4.
267. Li, supra note 30.
268. Dexheimer & Price, supra note 30.
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which are well described elsewhere," the thrust of the ESA
reforms was two-fold. First, the Clinton administration breathed
new life into the Habitat Conservation Plan, an old tool for
landowner flexibility once a species was listed. Second, the
administration created a new tool for pre-listing flexibility-the
same tool used in the Texas Conservation Plan-Candidate
Conservation Agreements with Assurances. As you might expect,
these flexible and industry-responsive reforms were part of the
pragmatic reinvention of environmentalism that pragtivists like The
Nature Conservancy and the Environmental Defense Fund
promoted. 2
Habitat Conservation Plans ("HCPs") were initially added to the
Endangered Species Act in 1982.271 The purpose was to add a
measure of leeway if landowners planned to carry out an otherwise
lawful activity but that activity might result in harm to a listed
species or its habitat.7 Congress determined that FWS should
allow such behavior, through an Incidental Take Permit, if "the
applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and
mitigate the impacts of such taking" and "the taking will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the
species in the wild."273 The Fish and Wildlife Service can only issue
an Incidental Take Permit if the landowner first provides a
conservation plan that specifies a number of factors including the
impact of her activity, how she will minimize and mitigate any
impact, funding sources to implement minimization and
mitigation, and alternative actions that the landowner has
considered.2 7 1 Habitat Conservation Plans did not garner
significant interest from developers until the 1990s when the Fish
and Wildlife Service developed the No Surprises Policy, which
assures a developer that whatever efforts she undertakes as part of a
269. E.g., Ruhl, supra note 1; J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative
Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 367 (1998) [hereinafter Who Needs
Congress?]; Kirsten Uchitel, PECE and Cooperative Conservation: Innovation or Subversion Under
the Endangered Species Act?, 26J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvt. L. 233 (2006).
270. Michael J. Bean et al., Safe Harbor Agreements, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY PRAC., Spring
2001, at 8; Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, National Endangered Species "Safe Harbor"
Policy Announced (June 17, 1999).
271. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B) (2012).
272. Ruhl, supra note 1, at 922.
273. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2) (B) (ii), (iv) (2012).
274. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
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Habitat Conservation Plan, FWS will not, even under changed
circumstances, impose additional requirements.2 75
Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances ("CCAAs"),
unlike Habitat Conservation Plans, are designed to incentivize pre-
listing conservation that will prevent the need for listing. CCAAs
are relatively simple bi-lateral agreements in which a landowner
agrees to take specific conservation measures and in return FWS
offers special protections.2 7' The landowner must undertake
conservation that, if done in combination with other landowners
undertaking the same measures, would be sufficient to protect the
candidate species to prevent listing.277  In return, the Fish and
Wildlife Service guarantees the landowner that it will not impose
any new requirement, even if the scientific information on which
the plan is based turns out to be faulty.7 Likewise, FWS assures
the landowner that if they do eventually list the species, the
landowner will not be subject to liability under the ESA's
prohibitions on harming a species or its habitat as long as the
landowner continues to operate under her conservation
promises.279
The Texas Conservation Plan for the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard is
essentially an amalgam of these tools, as well as others.28 0  Some
tools, like the CCAA, are immediately applicable once FWS finalizes
its agreement to the Plan.2 8 1  The HCP embedded in the Texas
Plan, as a counterexample, will become active should the Fish and
Wildlife Service eventually decide that a listing is warranted for the
Dunes Sagebrush Lizard.2 8 2
It was the heady pragmatic days of the Clinton administration
that gave birth to the notion of these flexible, bi-lateral, and
landowner-centric provisions. Throughout the 1990s there was a
widespread agreement that the Endangered Species Act was due
275. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859,
8859 (Feb. 23, 1998); Notice of Availability of Final Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,854, 63,856 (Dec. 2,
1996).
276. E.g., Jack G. Connors, Consering Habitat Before It Is Too Late, 35 PUB. LAND & RES. L.




280. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 3-7.
281. Id. at 25-26.
282. Id.
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for reform.2 " The exact nature of the necessary reform was less
unanimous, but there was a prevailing feeling that the Act had
become its own worst enemy. "Rather than convincing the
American people of the need to preserve biological diversity,"
argued Professor Fred Cheever in 1996, "the Act has apparently
convinced many that endangered species preservation is just
another onerous form of federal regulation."28" The solution,
therefore, was to encourage more private landowner engagement
in the process of protecting at-risk species through "cooperative
conservation" and negotiated compromises.2 8 ' All are hallmarks of
environmental pragtivism.
J.B. Ruhl, probably the leading expert on the Endangered
Species Act and, as described above, an avowed pragmatist of the
"radical middle,"28 ' has described the Clinton-era ESA reforms as
possibly the most pragmatic environmental agenda of the twentieth
century. It is, therefore, natural to offer this framework, and the
Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, as a model of pragtivism in action.
IV. UNPACKING PRAGTIVISM
The Endangered Species Act, which seemed so unanimously in
need of reform and increased flexibility in the mid-1990s,2 8 8 was not
always the strict and uncompromising dictator that it is often made
out to be. In fact, the Endangered Species Act as we know it
today-and as the pragtivists knew it in the 1990s-was an
outgrowth of two earlier laws, the Endangered Species Preservation
283. E.g., Who Needs Congress?, supra note 269, at 368-69.
284. Federico Cheever, The Road To Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered
Species Act, 23 ECOLOGYL.Q. 1, 4-5 (1996).
285. Uchitel, supra note 269, at 233.
286. Manifesto, supra note 2.
287. Ruhl, supra note 1, at 890-91.
288. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WAS IBURN L.J. 50, 51 (2001)
("Buffeted by the winds of controversy, in the mid-1990s the ESA seemed in danger of
snapping."); Jessica Owley, Keeping Track of Conservation, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 89 (2015)
(describing the Clinton administration reforming the ESA in order to "stave off attacks on
the ESA by hostile Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives"); Who Needs Congress?,
supra note 269, at 370 (arguing that Congress should "scrap the ESA entirely and start over
by designing a law that protects both ecosystems and economic interests in an effective,
balanced manner").
289. This is the point at which every other article ever written about the Endangered
Species Act has described it as a "pit bull."
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Act of 1966290 and the Endangered Species Conservation Act of
1969.9 In only a few short years between the enactment of these
laws and the 1973 Endangered Species Act, several things had
become quite clear to Congress. The "most notable weakness" of
the 1966 Act, for instance, "was that it placed no restriction
whatever on the taking of any species."2 9 2 The Endangered Species
Act's predecessors additionally failed because they simply didn't
prohibit killing individuals of endangered species, and the federal
government was only prohibited from killing when "'practicable
and consistent with the primary purposes"' of the agency.2 9 3 This
latter shortcoming is uncannily similar to the terms of the Texas
Agreement, which requests that industry protect the Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard, only when it does not disturb their primary
purpose, oil and gas development.
Pragmatism, as we have seen, is about rejecting fundamentalism
in deference to empiricism, using experience to balance values and
promote progress. I take these to be unimpeachable concepts, not
just in a philosophical framework, but also for good
decisionmaking in any endeavor. We need to ask, then, whether
pragtivism carries these good practices forward or merely sits idly
on the good impression that the word "pragmatic" seems to have in
society.
In this Part, I begin by giving a brief background on traditional
statutory environmental law so that we can decide whether it is
based on faulty ideology or practical experience. With that
background in view, we can dig deeper into a critique of
pragtivism, which will ultimately provide the basis for some
constructive improvements offered in Part V.
290. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926.
291. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275.
292. MICHAELJ. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAw 195 (3d ed. 1997). I cannot help but point out that the Environmental Defense Fund
was responsible for supporting this book, which, updated in 1997, clearly expressed concern
about the ineffectiveness of too much flexibility in wildlife conservation even while the
Environmental Defense Fund was working with the Clinton administration to add significant
new leeway to the Endangered Species Act. See Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, supra note
270.
293. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 292, at 199.
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A. A Brief Profile of Traditional Environmental Law
To tell the story of traditional environmental aw, I will use the
outline that EDF's Fred Krupp provided in his groundbreaking
1986 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, "New Environmentalism
Factors in Economic Needs,"294 with one major addition. In
Krupp's telling there are two waves of environmentalism that
existed before his "third wave" of pragtivism. The first wave is the
land and wildlife preservation of Teddy Roosevelt.295 In the early
twentieth century, the lessons of John Muir and his Sierra Club
were becoming widespread and Roosevelt's government made it a
priority to protect land and wildlife from the damage that humans
could cause in order to ensure that the same would be available to
future generations.9
The second wave emerged with Rachel Carson's book, Silent
Spring.2 17 This second environmental enlightenment was a wake-up
call to America, a lesson in the connectedness of humans and their
environment. Carson alerted the world to the way that pollutants
entered water, food, and air, and then entered our human
systems.9 The environment was no longer just something to
protect for its own good, and for future generations, but also for
human health and wellbeing in the here-and-now. This realization
was one part of Krupp's second wave environmentalism. It was one
part of the unrest that led to the Clean Water Act and Clean Air
Act, among other laws.29 9 The Carson wave taught us the risk of
pollution, but it didn't tell us what type of laws would solve the
problem. That was the business of a political scientist.
While Carson provided the motivation for environmental law, it
was Theodore J. Lowi's book, The End of Liberalism,300 which
provided the structure. In this self-described polemic,3 0 Lowi
explains an emergent structure of governance that he called
294. Krupp, supra note 183.
295. Id.
296. E.g., JEDEDIAII PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR TIHE ANTHROPOCENE 37-38
(2015).
297. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1st ed. 1962); Krupp, supra note 183.
298. CARSON, supra note 297, at 6.
299. Krupp, supra note 183.
300. THEODOREJ. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1st ed. 1969).
301. Id. at ix.
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"interest-group liberalism."30 2 "I[I]nterest-group liberalism," Lowi
wrote, "has sought to solve the problems of public authority by
defining them away. It seeks to "end the crisis of public
authority by avoiding law and by parceling out to private parties the
power to make public policy."3 0 ' Lest you doubt how Lowi felt
about interest-group liberalism, he calls it "[a] most maladaptive
political formula. .. [that] will inevitably exacerbate rather than
end the crisis, even though its short-run effects seem to be those of
consensus and stabilization."3 11
This is Lowi's critique of interest-group liberalism written nearly
a half century ago-just before the crafting of our most prominent
environmental laws. And there is no question that Lowi's ideas
helped shape the environmental laws of the 1970s.soe
"[T] he role that money plays in American politics gives, in effect,
louder voices and more votes to those who benefit from the present
economy, with all its ecological harms, than to those who seek to
change it." 30 7 Thus, strong, enforceable, and ratcheting standards,
strict deadlines, mandates with limited flexibility, and especially
citizen suits allowing outsiders to force government agencies to
follow the law, were all tools for breaking down the interest-group
liberalism and agency capture that Lowi identified.0 s Each of these
strictures, decried by pragtivists, was a recognition that flexibility,
bi-lateral negotiations, and collaborative governance were
impediments to achieving substantive public interest goals.0
In one sense, pragtivism is not new in the last decades, it is simply
a yearning to return to the days of interest-group liberalism. As
Sousa and Klyza described only a few years ago: "Frustration with
excessive adversarialism has pushed policy making down an old and
well-beaten path, one that policymakers of the 1970s thought they
had closed off with statutory mandates that are now widely viewed
as far too inflexible."310
302. Id. at 55.
303. Id. at 58.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. David J. Sousa & Christopher McGrory Klyza, New Directions in Environmental Policy
Making: An Emerging Collaborative Regime or Reinventing Interest Group Liberalism, 47 NAT. RES.J.
377, 381 (2007).
307. PURDY, supra note 296, at 271.
308. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 306, at 399.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 381. Make interest group liberalism great again?
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B. A Less Brief Critique of Pragtivism
Lowi had the chance to specifically consider his ideas applied to
pragtivism. In 1999 he confronted the pragtivist approach,
characterizing the pragtivists as believing that "we can have our
central government and reject it too."' And there can be little
question that this is a key pragtivist talking point. In his 1986 op-
ed, for instance, Krupp assures those who are weary of
environmentalism that market-oriented approaches and coalitions
with the regulated community are central, but then he reassures
environmentalists that his third wave "will still need skillful
advocacy-even in court-against narrow institutional vision or
vested interest in the status quo.... Strong regulation of pollution
will continue to be necessary.",1 Tercek makes the same promises
in his book, describing the three-legged stool that will only stand
with business-environmentalist partnerships, but also with
governments that are willing "to enact strong and effective
policies." 31 3
In his essay on the problems with the third wave of
environmentalism, Lowi pegged one of the motivations of
pragtivism. Where there is growing unrest or distrust of an idea,
some of the idea's proponents will "try to finesse the coercive
nature of public authority in order to validate, or embrace, or make
more convincing the key principles of that ideology as it goes into
decline."1 It may be unfair to assert that environmentalism was,
or is, in decline, but after eight years of the hostile Reagan
administration, and then again an overtly anti-environmental
Congress in the 1990s, one can be forgiven for thinking that
environmentalism was indeed in decline and that this political
moment was the catalyst for pragtivism's emergence. Or rather, as
we can now see, for environmentalism's nominally pragmatic turn
to an old structure that was already a manifest failure.
This is the first criticism of pragtivism, grounded in both
philosophical pragmatism and general good sense: it is important
to learn from mistakes and failures and to improve upon those
errors, but pragtivism is rehashing a dusty model that we have
already intentionally discarded. As Mary Jane Angelo has stated,
311. Theodore J. Lowi, 1ronlyard Propaganda, Bos. REv., October/November 1999, at 15.
312. Krupp, supra note 183.
313. TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at xvii.
314. Lowi, supra note 311.
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"[t]he pragmatist will look to what has worked best in the
experience of environmental law to date, and what has worked best
is, at least arguably, technology-based approaches"-that is,
"standards.""'
Unfortunately, this is not just poor hindsight, because pragtivists
have not just failed to learn from lessons of the more distant past.
The recent past is also proving a challenge. The response to the
disintegration of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership ("USCAP") is
a prime example.16  USCAP was a group of corporations and
environmental organizations that came together to advocate for
federal climate change legislation.17  That legislation died in
Congress in 2010.318 After Harvard political science professor
Theda Skocpol released a damning report, arguing that USCAP
failed to capture the public spirit,31 9 the Environmental Defense
Fund's Eric Pooley authored an article challenging Skocpol's
conclusions.2
Pooley makes several good points, but he fails to see the bigger
picture. The failure of the climate change legislation, he argues,
was not due to the existence of USCAP and its bi-lateral
negotiations. Instead, it was due to the President's failure to
prioritize, the financial meltdown, and the rise of the Tea Party.
Pooley is obviously right; each had to play a role. But with respect
to the President's prioritization and the rise of the Tea Party,
USCAP is relevant. The decision to focus on high-level
negotiations with corporate leadership rather than dedicating
more resources to generating on-the-ground excitement for
climate change action is entirely tied up in the politics of
presidential prioritization, while the emergence and power of the
Tea Party is a perfect example of the benefits of value-oriented
campaigning over backroom negotiating. This is but one example,
but such a high profile one warrants more self-reflection.
315. Angelo, supra note 1, at 129.
316. Note here that I do not want to point a finger at USCAP in itself as a problem,
merely the way its pragtivist members responded in the aftermath.
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I am in no position to say where the real failure lies, but when
Pooley digs his heels in on pragtivism and says that bi-lateral
collaboration is "the single most effective element of the climate
campaign, it makes one wonder whether he is learning from
experience. Pooley further argues that "EDF's [USCAP] strategy in
2009 wasn't driven by disdain for public involvement or a love of
insider deals; it was based on a hardheaded view of what presented
the best opportunity at the time."" So at the time, the pragtivist
strategy seemed best. Fair enough. And as pragmatists, we should
now presume that EDF learned from experience. But they did not.
Instead, Krupp returned to the pages of The Wall Street Journal to
assure readers that conservatives, corporations, and
environmentalists are still on the same page and only their
"consensus" will deliver solutions.2 Again, it is not that this is
facially wrong, only that it doesn't demonstrate self-reflective
pragmatism; it demonstrates dogmatic attachment to pre-
determined tools.
USCAP does highlight another shortcoming of pragtivism, the
one that Skocpol identified: a reduced respect for democratic
engagement. Simply put, when corporate-environmentalist or
corporate-government negotiations make environmental policy
rather than traditional legislative or administrative processes, it cuts
out the opportunity for public input.3 25 "It [gives] ordinary citizens
no way to resist environmental destruction."3 2 1 In the development
of Habitat Conservation Plans and Candidate Conservation
Agreements with Assurances, to use Endangered Species Act
examples, it is the private party that decide who gets to join the
327 i
negotiation. It is the Comptroller and the Texas Oil and Gas
Association, not the Fish and Wildlife Service, not even the
Environmental Defense Fund, who invite in the public.
It is arguable, perhaps even taken for granted, that public
participation is valuable in itself, but it is also valuable because it
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Krupp, supra note 184.
325. John W. Maxwell & Thomas P. Lyon, An Institutional Analysis of Environmental
Voluntay Agreements in the United States, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE
APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 340-41 (Eric
W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001).
326. PURDY, sufpra note 296, at 258.
327. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLAL. REV. 293, 309 (2007).
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opens a dialogue that increases the legitimacy of any outcome. It
aids the satisfaction that both Farber and Dewey demand in a good
process. Dewey argued that we need to make room for all values in
order to reduce "political strife," but bi- or even multi-lateral
partnership is not the democracy he had in mind." Broad public
engagement is superior; it avoids strife and builds legitimacy
because it creates opportunities for public input as well as public
persuasion, the latter being as much a part of good law and policy
as the substantive output.329 And as much as democracy creates
space for persuasion, pragtivism cuts it out. Nick Salafsky argues
that the pragmatic approach to conservation is actually the worst
among many choices because it uses vague notions of win-win
solutions to woo participants, but when platitudes dampen the
demand for real debate, they strangle public dialogue.30 When we
have debates rather than false promises of win-win solutions,
however, we open up the policy alternatives to robust criticism. As
Thomas McShane cautions, environmental problems are
"exacerbated by the rhetorical elegance of the win-win
paradigm."
Although distinct from the democratic deficit in pragtivism, the
rhetorical use of straw men is another way that pragtivism subtly
pushes aside a more robust public dialogue. Because pragtivism
defines itself, in part, by the ostensible ideologues with whom it is
parting ways, it is prone to mischaracterizing alternative strategies.
These are the environmentalists Krupp described in 1986 who "are
restlessly negative, opposing industry by reflex, standing in the way
of growth and driving up costs."3 2 In fairness, Krupp didn't exactly
describe environmentalists this way himself, but said "some believe"
in this construction.3 Ruhl is more explicit. In describing the
fatal dogma of traditional environmentalists, he points to the
Environmental Protection Information Center ("EPIC"), which was
fighting to protect the old-growth Headwaters Forest.33 1 He
describes EPIC's "narrow-minded"335 positivist extremism, writing
328. HUGH P. McDONALD,JOHN DEWEY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 171 (2004).
329. Hirokawa, supra note 1, at 255.
330. Salafsky, supra note 2, at 974.
331. McShane et al., supra note 2, at 969.
332. Krupp, supra note 183.
333. Id.
334. New (Pragmatist) Middle, supra note 151, at 534.
335. Id.
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that they were "advocating for the immediate, unequivocal
preservation of old growth redwoods."3 3 6
The characterization is too facile, merely a straw man, and
ignores the strategic benefits of staking out a strong and
uncompromising position. The environmentalists of EPIC and the
timber barons who were logging the old-growth forest certainly had
different values and perspectives, but it is unhelpful to paint them
each in only one cartoonish dimension. It is not only unfair, but in
a few respects also factually inaccurate. For example, EPIC was a
small regional group and it is not fair for Ruhl to use them as a
broader caricature of environmentalists. Most of the mainstream
environmental movement opposed the old-growth logging, but
they were not involved in the Headwaters campaign.3 Moreover,
although EPIC did advocate for a complete halt to logging in the
Headwaters, they were flexible in their tactics. They were willing,
for example, to promote a ballot initiative that included a sustained
yield system, not an unequivocal prohibition on all old-growth
logging.33 EPIC also played a part in what might have been the
first ever debt-for-nature swap to protect the forest.339 This is one
of the instruments that pragtivists proudly embrace today as a their
own novel strategy.340 And ultimately, perhaps most importantly,
EPIC's tactics were effective, leading to full protection of the old-
growth Headwaters Grove.4
Had EPIC announced that they were willing to compromise, or
even detailed the compromise that they would have accepted, their
negotiating position, their ability to achieve full protection, might
have failed. With regard to the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, now that
the oil and gas industry and the Fish and Wildlife Service know that
a major environmental group is willing to accept a plan like the
one in Texas, they have little incentive to offer anything more
protective.
336. Id.
337. DOUGLAS BEVINGTON, THE REBIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM
FROM THE SPOTTED OWL TO THE POLAR BEAR 41 (2009).
338. Id. at 49.
339. Id. at 56.
340. E.g., Swapping Debt to Save Oceans, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/
ourinitiatives/regions/africa/wherewework/seychelles.xml [https://perma.cc/8PFZ-S6FR]
(last visited May 16, 2017).
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In developing his cartoon, Ruhl begins at a single point in time,
without looking at the trajectory of experience and environmental
impact, or considering how that trajectory necessarily impacts
bargaining positions. Had EPIC been as dogmatic and unequivocal
as Ruhl implies, one might not blame them-might not even call
their actions unequivocal-when considering that the redwoods of
Headwaters once covered two million acres, but ninety-five percent
of that area had been logged by the time of the Headwaters fight. 342
EPIC had lost ninety-five percent of their fight before it even
began. To criticize them for being unequivocal is like criticizing a
triple amputee for his unwillingness to lose his last limb. Ruhl's
story would certainly be less effective if he explained that EPIC was
willing to compromise despite the fact that they were fighting to
protect only a portion of the last five percent of acreage on which
the magnificent redwoods lived. While EPIC may have been
"dogmatic" in their environmental goals, they did not display
inflexibility in their tactics, as Ruhl suggests.
On the whole, the use of straw men such as this gives the false
impression that "traditional" environmentalism is unwilling to
compromise, alienating, and ultimately undermining
environmental protection, despite evidence that claims of
dogmatism are unwarranted and that traditional environmentalists
have had remarkable successes.34 3
It is easier to criticize others through straw men than turn the
microscope on oneself, and the lack of definition around the use of
the word "pragmatic" in environmental action is a perfect example
of that. I have chosen the word pragtivism because I want to define
something that is not philosophical pragmatism, is not
environmental or legal pragmatism, but seems to be more
consistent than mere vernacular pragmatism. The very fact that
"pragmatism" or "pragmatic" appears so frequently on the material
of organizations that embody similar principles demonstrates that
there is some uniformity in use. Perhaps I have not explained
the use of "pragmatic" exactly as the pragtivists would explain it,
but that is evidence of an underlying problem. There has been too
little effort on the part of pragtivists to define "pragmatism" for
themselves.
342. Id. at 42.
343. Id. at 228-29.
344. See supra note 180.
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One glaring omission in pragtivism, which we cannot escape
without better definition, is where the value of environmentalism
comes from if it is really philosophical pragmatism from which
pragtivism descends. Among environmental philosophers, the
term pragmatism is used almost exclusively to understand what
ethics are appropriate for motivating environmental protection.
Pragmatism in this sense means we need not rely solely on intrinsic
values, or solely on anthropocentrism, to justify environmental
protection.46 Both can work. In pragtivism, the term "pragmatic"
is wielded to defend the use of multiple strategies, taking
underlying ethics as a given. This, I think, is a risk. Advocacy
organizations should pair their policy development and analysis
with efforts to establish a stronger public interest in environmental
protection rather than trying, essentially, to fool people into
supporting environmental protection under the guise of economic
growth as they do when they urge that a solution such as the Texas
Plan is a win-win for business and the environment.
A good pragmatist would surely tell you that there is no reason to
insist that we protect the environment only for the sake of
protecting the environment, and I agree with that in principle.
This is not a criticism of incorporating multiple values. It is a
criticism of a substitution of values and false claims of neutrality.
Pragmatic philosopher Ben Minteer, writing on this point,
essentially argued that it is not pragmatic to knock down one
dogma only to embrace a different one. But strategically, not
pragmatically, it is a particular risk for three reasons.
First, significant overt focus on paths of least resistance, on
business risk and economic matters, distracts from communicating
and influencing lasting public values:348 "the more we express
conservation's questions as matters of risk, the less able we seem to
be to grasp and communicate them as meaningful and momentous
choices in life."3 4 9  According to Cary Coglianese, "[t]he
pragmatism underlying the environmental mainstream" which is
345. E.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra note 1.
346. Weston, supra note 1, at 322.
347. See MINTEER, supra note 39, at 2 (describing the shortcomings of "dualistic
narrative[s]" that only offer competing dogmas).
348. I had thought of titling this article "Advocating From Nowhere," but decided on
something different out of respect for Doug Kysar. See KYSAR, supra note 175.
349. Jamison E. Colburn, Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation, 32 WASI .
U.J.L. & POL'Y 237, 238-39 (2010).
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intent on moving from engendering values to spreading tactics,
"has contributed to a sense of alienation and division that has
grown within some quarters of environmentalism."3 11 The
pragmatic reform, "if it is to have an enduring impact, needs to be
accompanied by a genuine change in public values."3 1' As it stands,
pragtivism is not focused on values; it is focused on the path of least
resistance, and if economic factors or business motivations change
and that path becomes more resistant, myopic pragtivism
undercuts the robust foundation of values.
Environmentalists may agree to work within a paradigm of
economic growth and corporate flexibility, but we ask very little of
our corporate partners in return. We put all our chips on their
motives, convincing them that conservation is good for the bottom
line. But we do not demand, in turn, that economic growth or
flexibility sometimes give ground in deference to human curiosity,
aesthetics, any intrinsic rights of non-humans, or whatever other
values might animate environmentalism.5 In this respect,
pragtivism is adhering to a "stubborn dogmatism"5 3 of economic-
oriented policy, and substituting that dogma for any lingering non-
economic motives, while only paying lip service to the latter.354 We
have hardly tried to persuade those who hold only economic values
that they should be loosening their positivism about unfettered
economic liberty.
"Environmentalists," writes Keith Hirokawa, "have initially
succeeded in convincing their adversaries to see the other side of
the land-the side not defined by economic value. The challenge
is to continue the progress." 35  This is a valid challenge, but one
that pragtivists seem not to have taken.
The second risk is that it may be primarily values, not tactics, that
are essential to reaching policy goals, and therefore, if we are not
350. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Inslitutionalization of the
Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 108 (2001).
351. Id. at 109.
352. See, for example, Tercek's statement that it's the environmentalists who have to
learn, not the businessmen. Hanscom, supra note 188.
353. MINTEER, supra note 39, at 255.
354. E.g., TERCEK & ADAMS, supra note 42, at xiv ("Environmentalists tend to love nature
for its own sake, love being outdoors, and believe their children and generations beyond
should inherit a world as vibrant and as diverse as the one they experienced. These are all
enormously important reason to protect nature. A business perspective, however, reveals
other, perhaps less lofty but no less important reasons to do so.").
355. Hirokawa, supra note 1, at 281.
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explicit about values, we will fail to reach our goals regardless of
tactics. To wax poetic for a moment: We can have the best map in
the world, but it does us little good if we don't know our
destination. In a recent paper, Michael Livermore and Richard
Revesz make this point by explaining that in the 1970s and 1980s,
industry groups were strong proponents of using economic tools
for policy development, while environmental groups opposed
them.356 Today, tactics have flipped completely. Both groups want
the same thing-more environmental protection or less
regulation-but they rely on the opposite tactics to get there.5 7 If
pragtivists are too "pragmatic," eschewing old values in favor of new
tools, then there is little to stop them from becoming attached to
the tools regardless of the benefit they provide. If we lose track of
the "dogmatic," "ideological," "positivistic" "extremism" of
preserving the environment, if we have no grounding, then how do
we know which direction will lead us home?
Similarly, the third risk of undefined motivations is the way it can
slyly facilitate a one-directional policy trajectory. Without being
clear about the baseline motivations, it is too easy to move from a
strict Endangered Species Act in 1973 to a circumscribed
Incidental Take allowance in 1982, to a more flexible "no surprises"
policy in the 1990s, and to the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard today (but
sadly, probably not tomorrow). The Lizard story is a striking
example of the way adherence to a tactical dogma but haze around
the underlying value motivation could allow EDF to support an
agreement with as many flaws as the Texas Plan for the Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard.
But this isn't at all limited to the Endangered Species Act. In
1986 Fred Krupp assured the public that his new environmentalism
was "in no sense a move toward compromise."'3 " That isn't how it
has played out in practice. Speaking of efforts to address climate
change at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Krupp lamented the fact
that "delegates decided that each nation would make its own plan"
to meet greenhouse gas reduction targets.359 The Environmental
Defense Fund, Krupp recounts, "knew this would be futile."3 0 By
356. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Interest Groups and Environmental Policy:
Inconsistent Positions and Missed Opportunitie, 45 ENVrL. L. 1, 2-3 (2015).
357. Id. at 3.
358. Krupp, supra note 183.
359. Making of a Market-Minded Environmentalist, supra note 192.
360. Id.
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2016, however, Krupp called the Paris climate change agreement,
which relies on each country developing its own plan for
greenhouse gas reductions, ' a "critical breakthrough."
3 6 2 In 2008
Krupp was strongly critical of a carbon tax as an alternative to cap
and trade, arguing that a tax has never "solved an air pollution
problem.363 In 2016 Krupp believes that a carbon tax is one way to
harness "the collective wisdom of the market."364
Maybe it is just that new information is making these more
permissive policies seem more substantively effective. It may also
be that when you describe a mission as "ways that work," but don't
ever define what "work" really means, then it is too easy to
compromise by substituting "work to get anything done" for "work
to protect the environment."
And as it turns out, at least some aspects of pragtivism are not
successful at protecting the environment. The Dunes Sagebrush
Lizard is one such example, but it is just a case study. As this
Section concludes, a brief return to Lowi's work is instructive. In
his 1999 essay criticizing over-reliance on flexibility in
environmental policy, he noted that too many supporters of
pragtivism "use case studies to give the impression of empirical
support for their process." Though possibly overbroad, the
criticism is reasonable. Mark Tercek's book is a compelling read
and encouragingly optimistic, but it is a series of stories about The
Nature Conservancy's successes, not an empirical analysis.6 Fred
Krupp's 1986 declaration of a new environmentalism told several
success stories as well. 3 6 7 These are useful stories, but they distract
from the empirical evidence, which is decidedly more negative
than pragtivists would have us believe.
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Speaking to the effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act's
HCP flexibility, Alejandro Camacho reported on the empirical
evidence of their success, which he found "reveals that the HCP
program predominantly serves to allow bilateral, ill-informed HCPs
to circumvent the ESA's" prohibitions.68 Camacho summarizes a
series of empirical studies and explains that the data show
shortcomings in HCP development and implementation. In
development, only forty percent of plans have any public
participation and when there is any negotiation it is only between a
regulated party and FWS.7 o Where private developers are involved,
the level of public participation drops even lower.' In HCP
implementation, stakeholders are routinely shut out from
monitoring, which is left entirely to the regulated party.7 But
studies show that more public input produces better HCPs in part
because participation leads to better integration of scientific
data. The Dunes Sagebrush Lizard plan, of course, reinforces
these studies, having been negotiated by the oil and gas industry
and the Texas Comptroller as an unenforceable way to avoid the
ESA's genuine requirements.
In the wider world of voluntary environmental agreements, Borck
and Coglianese developed a conceptual model of the effectiveness
of volunteerism and reviewed existing empirical work, finding
there is no evidence volunteerism works better than regulation,
and the opposite is probably true.37' Their model proposes that
effectiveness is a factor of the number of participants multiplied by
the average environmental benefit per participant, plus any
spillover effect on non-participants.3 7 5 There is, they find, research
in all three parameters,3 7 ' but no evidence of how the three work
together.7 This lack of integrative evidence may lead designers of
voluntary programs to err on the side of low average effects in
368. Camacho, supra note 327, at 308-09.
369. Id. at 313-17.
370. Id. at 313-14.
371. Id. at 315.
372. Id. at 316-17.
373. Id. at 319-20.
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order to increase total participation,7 ' and that can have a negative
environmental impact if done in lieu of enforceable regulation.7
In more recent work, Coglianese and Nash expand on the
downsides of voluntary environmental programs, explaining that
while they lower the costs of compliance, they also lower
environmental protection.s380 Any environmental protection "that
can be attributed solely to voluntary programs tend[s] to be
small-nearly indistinguishable in most cases from what might well
have happened anyway, in the absence of these programs."38 ' And
importantly, these small protections, where they do happen,
happen in only a small universe. The drivers of volunteerism-
regulatory avoidance, customer appeal, and managerial values-
"have proven insufficient to persuade any large fraction of
polluting firms to join voluntary programs let alone invest in major,
costly environmental improvements."" The research that
Coglianese and Nash review further demonstrates that pragtivist
clamor for more collaboration and less regulation is self-defeating
insofar as the reduced threat of mandatory regulation undermines
what little effectiveness voluntary programs might otherwise
have.3
In short, for both conservation and pollution, the record of win-
win "approaches is decidedly mixed,"384 and this is no short-term
assessment. In international conservation, more than twenty years'
experience indicates that "initiatives that produce win-win
outcomes appear to be the exception as opposed to the rule."
It is tempting to say, based on the evidence, that if pragtivists take
their claim of pragmatism seriously, it is time to accept the
evidence that their strategy doesn't work. But that may be too
simplistic. Tweaks, not wholesale rejection, are the way to start.
378. Id. at 320.
379. Id. at 317-18.
380. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Motivating Without Mandates? The Role of Voluntary
Programs in Environmental Governance, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 237 (Lee
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381. Id. at 246.
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V. A FRAMEWORK FOR MORE PRAGMATIC PRAGTIVISM
Pragtivism has promised us political and substantive success. It
takes as its premise that it can get things done, that it works. But so
far, as the previous Part argued, and the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard
particularly highlights, pragtivism has not been entirely successful
on the political front or in its environmental protection goals. I
hope that there are ways to improve this track record, and in this
Part I offer a framework of nine considerations, a check-list that
might help guide pragtivists to more consistent success.
The purpose of this framework is two-fold. First, as mentioned, I
hope the list will make the pragmatic strand of environmentalism
more effective. Second, I hope that this checklist will add
definition to the efforts of those who call themselves pragtivists.
The title of pragmatism is a claim to blankness, to no driving
philosophy, ideology, or dogma. It is, however, unrealistic to
imagine that any individual or organization acts without some
heuristic to guide decisionmaking. Pragtivists merely hide their
biases rather than expressing them and opening them to challenge
or refinement. Having just offered an extensive challenge, I now
also propose a refinement.
A. Transparency
Transparency is a simple demand for "[o]penness; clarity; [and]
lack of guile and of any attempt to hide damaging information.3 8 6
With respect to policy advocacy, transparency is a two-part demand.
First, if an organization prides itself on making surprising decisions
that unsettle expectations, there must be transparency in the
organizations' internal decisionmaking. The second demand is
that the policy or outcome on which the organization is
deliberating must have a sufficient degree of transparency as well.
This is a subjective determination, of course, but that does not
forgive a policy that completely lacks transparency. If there is a
good argument for avoiding transparency in a policy, the
supportive organization should publicly explain why that lack of
transparency is essential to positive environmental outcomes.
Support for the Texas Conservation Plan for the Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard illustrates a lack of transparency in both pragtivist
386. Transparency, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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decisionmaking and in the policy outcome. The Environmental
Defense Fund's support of the Plan says nothing-literally
nothing-about the specific provisions of the Texas Plan.87 Why,
despite the obvious political and substantive shortcomings, would
EDF support this Plan? There is no transparency in
decisionmaking, so we simply don't know.
The outcome likewise lacks transparency. Texas law makes the
details of each landowner's specific obligations, if any exist,
completely confidential. There is no way to know what private
parties have promised to do in return for assurances that they will
not be subject to future regulation. This lack of openness, lack of
clarity, is a fatal flaw.
B. Accountability
For any environmental policy to be effective, there must be some
degree of recourse if the regulated parties do not fulfill their
obligations. The subject of a policy must be "[r]esponsible;
answerable."8 There must be sufficiently precise standards and
some form of consequence for partners who do not meet these
standards. Citizen suits are one of the most well-known and
effective forms of holding both regulatory subjects and government
agencies to account. As a general rule of accountability,
environmentalists should always encourage citizen suit provisions
and precise standards that, when violated, can give rise to suits. But
lawsuits are a blunt object and may not be appropriate for all
circumstances. In the absence of citizen suits, any policy should
have some mechanism to make sure that parties remain faithful to
the terms of the policy.
The Texas Plan lacks sufficient accountability. Putting aside the
fact that neither the Fish and Wildlife Service nor the public are
privy to any requirements, the Texas Plan is limited in its
application; only those parties that voluntarily enroll are subject to
any requirements.8 9 Thus, by not listing the Dunes Sagebrush
Lizard under the Endangered Species Act, all non-participating
landowners are not accountable to anybody for any acts related to
the Lizard. For those who are enrolled, the remedy under the
387. Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, supra note 20.
388. Accountable, BLACK's LAw DIC'IONARY (10th ed. 2014).
389. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 3, at 1.
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Texas Plan is expulsion from the Plan."o Once expelled, the
landowner is subject to even fewer restrictions. The downside of
expulsion is that ifFWS ever lists the Lizard, a landowner who does
not participate in the Texas Plan may be subject to new
restrictions.3' The risk here is low because the Comptroller, not
FWS, decides whether or not to expel a Plan participant,3 2 and
because the expulsion of a single landowner doesn't undo the Plan.
As long as the Plan meets FWS's relatively low standards for
effectiveness, the agency is unlikely to list.
C. Monitoring
Like accountability, monitoring has two components. The first
component is data availability. There should be provisions for data
collection in any policy, and that data should be available to both
the government and the public or at least an independent third
party. The second component of monitoring is adaptability. Any
environmental program should include a defined process for
revisions, including increasing stringency, when data suggests that
such revisions are necessary. Nobody who uses the word
"pragmatic," even in its loosest sense, can ignore the need for
monitoring success and responding to failures.
Here the Texas Plan fares slightly better than it does compared
to other elements. The Plan has provisions for compliance
monitoring, effectiveness monitoring, and adaptive
management.39 The compliance monitoring provisions are hollow
because they merely describe what general items may be included
in a compliance-monitoring plan, but they leave details to the
confidential individual Certificates of Inclusion.394  The
effectiveness monitoring structure does identify specific techniques
for data gathering and adopts standards and protocols.3 9 5  The
primary shortcoming is that effectiveness monitoring is aimed only
at Lizard presence or likelihood of absence, rather than habitat
destruction, fragmentation, or other baselines that are more
390. Id. at 53-54.
391. Id. at 56.
392. The Plan does allow FWS to suspend or revoke participation for individual
landowners, but because FWS does not have access to the applicable requirements for each
landowner, making such a determination would be impossible. Id.
393. Id. at 29-30, 33-36.
394. Id. at 30-31.
395. Id.
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indicative of long-term survival."9 Finally, the Plan has adaptive
management provisions, but those provisions include a major
loophole, which is that the parties agree to adapt their efforts only
when "agreed to by both parties," meaning there is no adaptation if
the industry doesn't prefer it.3 9 7 And for all these provisions, the
Plan does not include third party or public monitoring. It allows
industry self-monitoring that is only presented to the Fish and
Wildlife Service as an aggregated summary.
D. Outcome Aggregation
Good policy is good not only in isolation, but in the aggregate.
Mission-oriented policy analysis will thus benefit from the practical
exercise of asking whether a policy that might seem sufficient on its
own would be sufficient if replicated ad infinitum. Would the
environmental outcomes of a single policy be sustainable if a
similar policy were repeated across the board?
The Texas Plan, if anything, promises that it will disturb a
maximum of ten percent of habitat in which the Lizard is actually
located. Can non-human species survive if humans destroy ten
percent of their occupied habitat? How do we account for the fact
that this ten percent destruction allowance comes on top of
unfettered habitat destruction that took place for decades before
Lizard conservation was even on the radar? This is a scientific
question, of course, and too difficult to answer. We can instead
tackle the policy question. Can we expect to protect the
environment if we only engage with voluntary, standard-free,
unenforceable environmental programs? The evidence suggests
that we cannot.3 9 9
This may seem like exactly the sort of un-pragmatic argument
that a pragtivist would distain. "We cannot," they would challenge,
"expect a perfect outcome every time. We must be willing to get
the best outcome in some cases, or even a compromise. We hurt
the environment by holding out only for ideal solutions." But I am
not urging that we wait for perfect solutions. I don't even urge
waiting for the very best solution. All I suggest is that we only
396. Id.
397. Id. at 33-36.
398. Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 1, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
399. Borck & Coglianese, supra note 374, at 318-19.
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accept solutions that would not, in aggregate, be a net negative for
the environment we are trying to protect.
E. Precaution
Effective policy must be sufficiently precautionary. This is not a
standard recitation of the precautionary principle. It is not a
blanket resistance to new practices because of potential negative
outcomes. Precaution is a reminder to pragtivists to ask whether
their proposal relies on a speculative future contingency such as
economic changes or technological innovations and, if it does,
what costs would we encounter if the contingency does not come to
pass. When the costs of a policy are born by a politically and
economically isolated interest and the costs are irreversible, the
need for more precaution is paramount.00 Colin Diver cautioned
decades ago that "when small errors in policy can cause irreversible
or even catastrophic harm," such as the case with endangered
species, it is proper to rely on a less pragmatic, and more
precautionary approach.401 So the precaution here is not so much
about the outcome of policy as about the value orientation of the
policy itself, and how much the policy seeks to achieve.
When given the choice between listing a species under the
Endangered Species Act or subjecting it to a speculative voluntary
agreement that is contingent on economic factors, the
irreversibility of extinction clearly weighs in favor of the
enforceable public law and not unenforceable industry promises.
F. Confidence
Confidence in the good faith of a partner in a bi-lateral
environmental program is essential. Has the partner demonstrated
a commitment to environmental protection in the past? Has the
partner entered into negotiations because it shows genuine interest
in improving its environmental performance or at least in
proactively improving its bottom line, or has it entered in order to
avoid a more environmentally protective regime? These questions
are about the motivation of the partner, but it is not inherently
important that the partner's motivation is unimpeachable. These
inquiries are important because they are proxies for how well a
400. Diver, supra note 1, at 431.
401. Id.
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resulting policy is likely to work. If the partner has the right
motivations it will increase the chances of honest and successful
implementation.
But there must be an opportunity for actors with bad reputations
to redeem themselves. Partnership-based environmentalism
cannot be limited only to those already working toward protection.
A sliding scale can resolve this apparent limitation. In cases with
more trustworthy partners, there is room for more flexibility in
implementation. Where partners have questionable motivations
and track records, more stringent programs are necessary.
Given the decades-old resistance of Texas and the oil and gas
industry to conserve the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, as well as the
political manipulation that the industry orchestrated in the run-up
to the Texas Plan, a stricter program with more certainty of success
was required. Instead, the Texas Plan is on the most flexible and
speculative end of the implementation spectrum.
G. Participation
Environmentalism exists because there is public interest at stake
in protecting the environment, whether it is economic, aesthetic,
or otherwise. When the public interest is central to a policy, public
participation is essential. Public participation is necessary in both
the policy development stage and the implementation stage. The
public should have an opportunity to weigh in on not only project
development but also, and more importantly, project
implementation.
The development of the Texas Plan did have an opportunity for
public input because FWS incorporated the Plan into the public
comment period for its proposed rule to list the Dunes Sagebrush
Lizard.12  In the implementation phase there is no public
participation whatsoever. From the confidentiality of the
conservation provisions to the private nature of the
implementation, those with interest in the Lizard's survival are
excluded from the process.
H. Strategy
Each environmental policy does not stand on its own; it is part of
a larger strategic ecosystem, and an advocate must, therefore,
402. Withdrawal, supra note 7, at 36,875.
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consider the strategic impact of any individual policy position.
Advocates should particularly ask how a policy impacts bargaining
position in future interactions. Do not approach a policy debate by
starting where you hope to end. For example, if a party to a
negotiation is willing to accept $10, she is advised to start by asking
for $50, not by telling her counterparty that she will ultimately
accept as little as $10. The same strategy applies to policy debates.
If the Environmental Defense Fund is willing to accept Lizard
conservation that requires, at best, a cap of habitat destruction at
ten percent, then it is strategically unwise to announce that to a
counterparty. In the case of the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, the
Environmental Defense Fund was not a part of the negotiation, so
their error was validating a weak outcome. In so doing, they
alerted the Fish and Wildlife Service to the fact that they are willing
to accept such an insignificant conservation result. They likewise
signal to industry partners (or opponents, hould that happen) that
they are willing to accept an outcome on par with the Texas Plan.
In future negotiations that is now the starting point, not the end
point. Now that all parties know what EDF is willing to accept,
remembering that industry and property-rights advocates with their
own interests are on the other side of the negotiating table, we can
expect a future negotiation to produce a less restrictive result even
than the Texas Plan.
I. Signaling
The concept of signaling is uniquely important to
decisionmaking in the advocacy context. Signaling is the process of
communicating or influencing values above and beyond the mere
language of a policy. Passage of a law can communicate more to
the public than the bald letter of the law."0' Speaking of the
passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964, Jedediah Purdy wrote that it
"won acreage for a new idea, adding wilderness to the geography of
American ideals.""0' Passage of the Act, and other environmental
laws, signaled a commitment and a prioritization of certain
403. E.gJONATIIAN Z. CANNON, ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALANCE: THE GREEN MOVEMENT
AND THE SUPREME COURT, at 5 (2015); PURDY, supra note 296, at 210-11; Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public
Law, 89 MICi. L. REV. 875,905 (1991).
404. PURDY, supra note 296, at 190.
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values.05 Put differently, a pragtivist should ask not only what a law
or policy will require, but what it says to the public about important
issues. In some cases, a policy not only achieves discrete goals, it
engenders cultural acceptance of new values.106  Sometimes
lawmakers, but especially advocates, need to get in front of public
opinion, not merely respond to it. That isn't always possible, but at
the very least, no environmental advocate should support a policy
that sends a signal of declining environmental values.
A number of more specific inquiries can help a pragtivist parse
out the signal that a policy might send. The timing of the action,
for instance, can indicate whether the policy signals proactive and
precautionary action or brinksmanship and delay. The fact that
the oil and gas industry did not respond to known threats to the
Lizard's existence until thirty years after problems were first
identified, or even until after the close of the first FWS comment
period, demonstrates an effort at avoidance and brinksmanship on
the part of industry. When EDF lent its support to the weak
outcome of this game-playing, it sent the wrong signal.
The effort that a regulated party displays is also relevant. This is
counterintuitive since the momentum is clearly behind more
efficiency and less burdensome regulations, and there are very
good reasons for this. But we have to ask whether a policy permits
the regulated community to do as little as possible or to put skin in
the game. It may seem superficial, but when a public interest is at
stake, the public has its skin in the game and industry sends an
important signal when it refuses to share that burden.
Signaling, in essence, is a consideration of whether the process of
developing a new policy was sufficiently satisfying-in the Deweyan
and Farberian sense-to attract support, or at least avoid
condemnation, from most participants.
By supporting a policy that was crafted by and for the industry,
contained few enforceable provisions, did an end-run around a
seminal environmental law, provided no assurances of
effectiveness, and expressed clear preference for uninterrupted
industrial activity in lieu of species conservation, support for the
Texas Plan sends exactly the wrong signal. If pragtivism is a focus
on tactics rather than values, this lesson may be hard to absorb, but
it is no less essential.
405. Id.
406. Id.; Farber & Frickey, supra note 403, at 905.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Pragtivists do not claim to adopt philosophically pragmatic
ground rules for their efforts, so it is not entirely fair to critique
their work only as divergent from philosophical principles. For
that matter, pragtivists do not even claim that, in using the word
"pragmatic," they are adopting any consistent meaning or implying
a unique brand of activism. Nevertheless, as I hope this Article
shows, there is indeed a style of practice attached to pragtivism, and
that style deserves more rigorous attention.
I have argued that pragtivism is a series of policy tools that define
themselves in opposition to traditional environmental law and to
the typical values that underlie traditional environmental law. In
contrast to strict standards and timelines, citizen participation, and
strong enforcement options, pragtivism is focused on regulatory
flexibility, bi- or multi-lateral negotiations, and volunteerism. This
framework is premised on the importance of engaging economic
actors and assuring them minimal burden. To be absolutely clear, I
believe these approaches are essential to environmental policy, but
they should be just that: a part of environmentalism, not a central
doctrine. When they become the central doctrine-as the Dunes
Sagebrush Lizard experience exposes-they can weaken the entire
endeavor. The constant refrain of "pragmatic" in the new
environmental lexicon elevates the importance of pragtivist tools
and obfuscates their exact nature.
Here is the most important point of this Article: Pragtivists use
and re-use the term pragmatic but never explain it, allowing the
word to mask complex and important tactical and value judgments
that should be more explicit because these judgments have
significant influence on environmental protection. The word
masks judgments that should be considered and debated, not
waved away. Just as laws can have power to stimulate values that are
farther reaching than the letter of the law, words too have power
beyond their definitions. Sometimes that power creates
excitement, sometimes dread, often something in between. But
sometimes that power disguises deeper meaning. This is, in part,
Charles Taylor's "ethics of articulacy-the work of saying what we
mean, finding words for what we see and feel."107 This is about
moving beyond proxy wars and discovering motivating values. If we
407. PURDY, supra note 296, at 266.
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don't grasp the meaning of a word, we cannot debate the practices
carried out in the shade it casts. Pragmatism demands debate, as
does effective environmental decisionmaking.

